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INTRODUCTION 
In April 1990, the United States ignited a "firestorm of diplomatic 
* Law Clerk, Hon. J. Clifford Wallace, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2003-2004. 
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Michael Reisman, and Michael Soules for invaluable comments and conversations. 
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criticism" by orchestrating the abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, a Mexican citizen, from his office in Guadalajara, Mexico.' 
Upon his arrival in Texas, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
officials arrested Alvarez-Machain on charges associated with the 1985 
kidnapping and slaying of DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in 
Mexico.2 Counsel for Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that the United States lacked jurisdiction because 
his abduction violated the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty.3 Although 
the district court4 and the Ninth Circuit5 found a clear violation of the 
treaty, the Supreme Court reversed. Noting that no specific provision in 
the treaty explicitly prohibited extraterritorial law enforcement 
operations, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded 
that the United States necessarily retained this sovereign right. Alvarez-
Machain's abduction may have been "shocking and ... in violation of 
general international law principles," but the Court nevertheless 
downplayed customary international law's relevance to the task of 
treaty construction.6 "[T]he practice of nations under customary 
international law," Justice Rehnquist wrote, is "of little aid in construing 
the terms of an extradition treaty or the authority of a court to later try 
an individual who has been so abducted."7 
I. David 0 . Stewart, The Price of Vengeance: U.S. Feels Heat for Ruling that Permits 
Government Kidnapping, 78 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (Nov. 1992); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 
504 u.s. 655, 657 (1992). 
2. !d. 
3. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Extradition 
Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]). 
4. !d. 
5. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). 
6. !d. at 669-70 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 668 n. l5 . Upon remand, the district court ultimately 
dismissed the charges against Alvarez-Machain, finding the government's evidence insufficient. 
Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent 's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20, cited 
in Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 42 (1994). 
In 2001 , the Ninth Circuit concluded that the kidnapping indeed violated Alvarez-Machain ' s 
customary international rights to freedom of movement, to remain in his own country, and to 
enjoy security in his person, as well as customary prohibitions against arbitrary detention. 
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050-52 (9th Cir. 2001), reh 'g granted, 
Alvarez-Machain v. [Order] United States, 284 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). The customary 
prohibition against acts of force by one sovereign State within another's territory finds expression 
in numerous international agreements and treatises. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 
(obligating "all members" to "refrain .. . from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State .. .. "); Charter of the Organization of American 
States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, 
Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S .T. 607, 721 U.N.T.S. 324; I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 128 
n.l, at 295 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) ("It is .. . a breach oflnternational Law for a State to 
send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of having committed 
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Although Alvarez-Machain has inspired substantial academic 
literature,8 surprisingly little attention has been paid to the decision's 
broader implications for U.S. courts' interpretation of international 
agreements. Alvarez-Machain is remarkable not only for the Supreme 
Court's sweeping repudiation of the customary norm against 
extraterritorial abductions, but more generally for its failure to recognize 
or employ customary international canons of treaty construction. In 
construing the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, neither the majority nor 
the dissent makes even passing reference to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),9 a multilateral treaty prepared 
by the United Nations that codifies the customary international canons 
governing international agreements.10 This oversight is particularly 
striking given that the Convention directly addresses two critical issues 
that divided the majority and dissent in Alvarez-Machain: ( 1) the 
relevance of customary international norms in treaty interpretation, and 
(2) the degree of deference that courts should render to extra-textual 
materials. Had all nine justices employed the Vienna Convention's 
directive to interpret the Extradition Treaty in conformity with all 
"relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties," 11 the rationale advanced in Justice Blackrnun's dissent 
likely would have prevailed. 12 
Notwithstanding the Vienna Convention's internationally 
authoritative status, the Supreme Court has never applied the 
a crime"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE fOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
432 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("A state ' s law enforcement officers may exercise their 
functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly 
authorized officials of that state"). 
8. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-
Machain, 45 STAN . L. REV. 939 (1993); Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A 
Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM . J. INT'L L. 746 (1992); Jordan J. Paust, 
After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and Unaddressed Human Rights 
Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 551 (1993); Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: 
The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme Court 's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 
TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994). 
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 , reprinted in 
8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
10. A separate convention governs the interpretation of agreements between States and 
international organizations and agreements between international organizations . Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations, Mar. 21,1986, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.I29/15, reprinted in 
25 ILM 543 (1986). 
II. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c). 
12. See Alvarez- Machain, 504 U.S. at 678-81 (1992) (Stevens, J., Blackmun, J., and 
O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that treaty partners cannot idly be presumed to abrogate the 
law of nations). 
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Convention as U.S. law. In fact, since its entry into force in 1980, only 
two Supreme Court opinions have cited the Vienna Convention-one a 
majority opinion authored by the Chief Justice, which distinguishes the 
Constitution's narrow definition of "treaties" from the Convention's 
broader definition, 13 and the other a 1 one dissenting opinion by Justice 
Blackmun, citing the Vienna Convention as incidental support for 
principles already firmly entrenched in federal common law. 14 No 
member of the Court has ever appealed to the Vienna Convention for an 
independent and controlling rule of decision. 
By contrast, many lower federal and state courts apply the 
Convention's treaty-interpretation provisions routinely as customary 
international law. "When resolving [treaty-related] questions," the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained recently, "we apply the 
rules of customary international law enunciated in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties."15 Although the Senate has yet to 
ratify the Vienna Convention, these courts rely on the Convention as a 
"restatement of customary rules" that "binds States regardless of 
whether they are parties." 16 
Tensions between the Vienna Convention's customary canons and 
the Supreme Court's nationalist treaty jurisprudence raise challenging 
questions about the interrelationship between international and domestic 
treaty law: Is "the practice of nations under customary international 
law," as expressed in the Vienna Convention, indeed "of little aid" in 
domestic treaty interpretation? When U.S. courts interpret treaties, 
should they look to customary international law for guidance? 
To date, few have answered Justice Rehnquist's challenge. For 
example, the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) on the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement) openly 
acknowledges the nationalist/internationalist schism in U.S. treaty 
13. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (noting that the Vienna Convention "does 
not distinguish between agreements designated as 'treaties' and other agreements" between 
States, while the Constitutional meaning of the word "treaty" is restricted to instruments 
concluded pursuant to Article II, § 2, cl. 2). 
14. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(citing the Convention for the proposition that a treaty "must first be construed according to its 
'ordinary meaning"'). 
15. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001). 
16. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,308 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Maria 
Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1988)) (citing opinions of the International Court of Justice). A Westlaw 
search finds that Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention have been cited only thirteen times by 
U.S. federal courts and two times by state courts. In comparison, Westlaw indicates that the 
European Court of Human Rights has cited these provisions twenty-three times. 
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interpretation, 17 yet vacillates between the two approaches, res1stmg 
some customary international canons which conflict with U.S. practice, 
while accepting others as binding "even if the United States 
jurisprudence of interpretation might have led to a different result." 18 
Other commentators have given the issues similarly short shrift. 
This article bridges the gap between the nationalist and 
internationalist approaches in U.S. treaty interpretation by seeking 
answers to three interrelated questions: First, how do contemporary 
common law canons differ from the Vienna Convention's 
internationalist approach? Second, have U.S. courts historically 
approached treaty interpretation from a nationalist or internationalist 
perspective? Third, is the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework 
compatible with the United States' constitutional commitments and 
sovereign prerogatives as currently recognized by U.S. courts? 
Part I addresses the first of these questions by exploring the Vienna 
Convention's drafting history and by contrasting its salient provisions 
with contemporary common law canons. Although the Senate has not 
ratified the Vienna Convention, the United States is a signatory, and 
both the executive and legislative branches employ the Convention as 
an authoritative guide to international treaty law. The Vienna 
Convention and the nationalist approaches differ in at least three critical 
respects: First, the Vienna Convention gives courts less freedom to 
explore extra-textual materials beyond travaux preparatoires. Second, 
although the Vienna Convention discourages courts from deferring to a 
single state's uncorroborated treaty interpretations, domestic courts 
regularly give substantial deference to executive branch 
interpretations--even when treaty partners contest these interpretations. 
Third, the nationalist approach and the Vienna Convention take 
radically different approaches to customary international law as an 
interpretive guide. These methodological distinctions are not merely of 
academic interest, I argue, because they go to the heart of a much larger 
debate concerning U.S. courts' proper institutional role in resolving 
international disputes. Whereas the Vienna Convention envisions 
municipal courts in treaty cases as quasi-international tribunals 
committed to traditional rule-of-law values, the nationalist approach 
views U.S. courts as agents of national sovereignty with an obligation to 
maximize the United States' immediate strategic interests. Thus, the 
choice between the Vienna Convention and nationalist treaty canons 
17. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, cmt. (d)-(g), at 197-98 (1987) (discussing differences 
between the Vienna Convention's rules and U.S. practice). 
18. !d. at 201 n.4. 
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engages broader debates over American exceptionalism in foreign 
affairs. 
Part II explores international treaty canons' traditional role in U.S. 
jurisprudence. The Constitution gives the federal judiciary stewardship 
over domestic treaty law, but it provides little guidance concerning the 
principles that courts should apply in treaty construction. Since the 
founding, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that U.S. courts 
must interpret treaties according to internationally authoritative canons. 
The current nationalist/internationalist tension in U.S. treaty 
interpretation owes more to historical accident and common law inertia, 
I argue, than constitutional principle or original intent. 
Part III evaluates contemporary justifications for the United States' 
nationalist approach. American scholars typically rationalize departures 
from the Vienna Convention's guidelines by raising constitutional 
objections and casting doubt on customary international law's nature 
and function. This discussion demonstrates, however, that relatively few 
elements of the nationalist approach are strictly required as a matter of 
U.S. constitutional or international law. Excepting Senate reservations, 
declarations, and understandings, courts have no legitimate legal 
justification to disregard international treaty canons. 
Looking forward, Part IV argues that U.S. courts may revitalize the 
internationalist paradigm in U.S. treaty jurisprudence by applying the 
Vienna Convention's customary canons as U.S. law. The Vienna 
Convention enhances U.S. treaty law's coherence and provides a 
potential corrective to the nationalist approach's disregard for non-state 
actors. The Convention also focuses courts' attention on the 
international legitimacy and acceptability of domestic treaty-related 
decisions. Finally, the Convention's customary canons provide a 
rudimentary legal grammar (i.e., a set of common concepts and 
principles) that may facilitate more effective dialogue between foreign, 
international, and domestic courts. Incorporating these customary 
canons into U.S. jurisprudence represents a critical step toward the 
development of a coordinated international system for treaty 
adjudication. 
I. U.S. TREATY INTERPRETATION AT A CROSSROADS 
Globalization's acceleration has forced nation-states to adopt 
innovative, collaborative strategies to handle the expanding 
transnational dimensions of commerce, communications, criminal 
networks, environmental harms, human migration, and other collective 
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concerns. International agreements like the U.S.-Mexico Extradition 
Treaty lend enhanced clarity to public and private legal regimes in the 
international arena. But the proliferation of international regulatory 
agreements raises yet another pressing dilemma of transnational 
proportions: the need to develop internationally acceptable principles 
for interpreting international agreements. 
As this part demonstrates, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties represents the global community's authoritative response to this 
global problem. The Vienna Convention provides a distinct interpretive 
framework founded on authoritative principles of customary 
international law. To the extent that U.S. courts have not fully 
assimilated the Vienna Convention's customary canons, I argue that this 
methodological dissonance reflects a basic tension between two 
competing visions of U.S. courts' appropriate role in treaty litigation: 
( 1) an internationalist approach attuned to international custom and 
committed to the promotion of an orderly international system, and (2) a 
nationalist approach that draws interpretive principles analogically from 
national law and adapts to shifting foreign-policy preferences. 
A. The Treaty to Govern All Treaties 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties represents the 
culminating achievement of a decades-long effort to establish an 
international grammar for treaty interpretation. Pursuant to Article 13 of 
the UN Charter, 19 the UN General Assembly delegated this task to the 
International Law Commission (ILC), a working group of thirty-four 
leading publicists charged with "making the evidence of customary 
international law more readily available" through the codification and 
progressive development of international custom.20 The ILC labored 
over its "treaty on treaties"21 for over two decades, engaging the talents 
of many of the leading internationalist scholars of the era; ILC 
rapporteurs during this period included such eminent legal luminaries as 
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 13. Article 13 authorizes the General Assembly to "initiate studies 
and make recommendations" for the following purposes: 
Promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification; 
Promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, 
and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
!d. at 12. 
20. MARK E. VILUGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 75-76 (1997). 
21. Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 
(1970). 
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James L. Brierly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and 
Sir Humphrey Waldock.22 The Commission's 1966 draft convention 
provided the starting point for the UN Conference on the Law of 
Treaties, which convened on March 26, 1968.23 
The Conference's final product-the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties-consists of eight parts and a brief annex. Subjects 
addressed include treaties' conclusion and entry into force (II); 
observation, application, and interpretation (III); amendment and 
modification (IV); invalidity, termination, and suspension (V); and 
depositaries, notification, corrections, and registration (VII). For present 
purposes, however, the Convention's most important provisions are 
Articles 31-33, which incorporate customary international treaty canons 
into a unified interpretive framework. 
Article 31 enshrines a robust textualist canon: treaties, are to be 
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty."24 As one ILC member explained during 
a drafting session, "[t]he starting point of interpretation is the 
elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into 
the intentions of the parties."25 Where feasible, courts should construe 
provisions in a manner that honors the agreement's "object and 
purpose."26 In addition, a treaty's terms are to be understood "in their 
context,"27 which the Convention defines narrowly as including, "in 
addition to the text [and] the preamble and annexes": 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
22. /d. at 51. 
23. For a comprehensive record of the Conference proceedings, see United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ll (1969) 
[hereinafter Vienna Conference I] and United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 
Official Records, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/Il/ Add.! ( 1970) [hereinafter Vienna 
Conference 2]; E.W. Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations Between Parties to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and States not Party to the Convention, 76 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 779,779 {1982). 
24. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(1). Interpreters are only to depart from a term's 
ordinary meaning "if it is established that the parties so intended." /d. art. 31(4); see also 
Advisory Opinion, Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3) ("The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a 
tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavor to 
give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of which they occur."). 
25. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its 17th Session and 
on its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 220, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l [hereinafter 
Reports]. 
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(1). 
27. /d. art. 31{1). 
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[and] 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 28 
439 
Such ancillary agreements and instruments facilitate successful 
negotiation by clarifying sensitive diplomatic compromises that find 
imprecise expression within the original treaty text. 
Recognizing that strict adherence to a treaty provision's ordinary 
meaning will occasionally lead to unreasonable or absurd results, the 
Convention's drafters softened Article 31's "ordinary meaning" 
presumption with several important caveats. First, interpreters may 
attribute a "special meaning" to a particular term if the treaty's text 
suggests that the parties intended to use treaty terms in an idiosyncratic 
sense. 29 Second, courts may deviate from "ordinary meaning" when 
treaty parties conclude a subsequent agreement that otherwise elucidates 
or reconfigures "the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions. "30 Third, interpreters may consider parties' "subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation."31 Like subsequent 
agreements, parties' post-ratification practice may reflect an implicit 
agreement to revise the original treaty document. 
Article 33, which governs the interpretation of treaties authenticated 
in two or more languages, offers yet another basis for departure from 
Article 31's "ordinary meaning" canon. Unless otherwise expressed, the 
Convention declares that a treaty text "is equally authoritative in each 
[authenticated] language."32 Where incongruences in translation render a 
text's "ordinary meaning" ambiguous, Article 33 instructs courts to look 
for zones of overlapping signification, on the presumption that treaties 
bear "the same meaning in each authentic text. "33 
Finally, Article 32 rounds out the exceptions to the Vienna 
Convention's textualist canon by providing for judicial recourse to 
"supplementary means of interpretation": 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
28. !d. art. 31 (2). 
29. /d. art. 31 ( 4). 
30. /d. art. 31(3)(a). 
31. /d. art. 31(3)(a)-(b). 
32. !d. art. 33(1). 
33. /d. art. 33(3)-(4). 
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resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: leaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.34 
Construed strictly, Article 32 decrees that courts may not consider 
travaux prtiparatoires except in extraordinary cases where Article 31 
would render an ambiguous, obscure, "manifestly" absurd, or otherwise 
unreasonable result. Article 32 does not specify with great precision, 
however, how much ambiguity or obscurity must persist after Article 31 
analysis in order to trigger Article 32(a). The Convention's assertion 
that courts may reference preparatory material "in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of article 31" suggests that even 
reasonable doubt may justify Article 32 analysis. This weaker 
formulation tracks courts' actual practice more closely and reflects a 
more realistic portrait of the adjudicatory process; as long as litigants 
bring travaux to courts' attention-as they always do-courts cannot 
prevent Article 31 analysis from becoming prematurely "contaminated" 
by these supplementary materials. 35 Indeed, the ILC itself recognized 
that the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework should be 
understood as "accumulative, not consecutive."36 Articles 31 and 32 
might assign different weight to different sources, but interpreters 
should not convert these provisions into an overly mechanistic process. 
No matter how one spins Article 32, the provision clearly anticipates 
that courts will privilege a text's "ordinary meaning" over insights 
34. I d. art. 32. "Supplementary means of interpretation" may include traditional interpretive 
canons such as lex specialis derogat legi generali (specific rule prevails over general rule) and lex 
posterior derogat /egi prior (last in time rule) . ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 200-0 I (2000). However, the Vienna Convention clearly disfavors domestic 
ratification materials outside the agreement's official travaux preparatoire. 
35. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT ' L L. 281 , 296-97 (1988) (expressing skepticism regarding the courts ' 
capacity to consider travaux as a second-level consideration without having this analysis color 
their first-level textualist construction). The ICJ has, in fact, refused to consider preparatory work 
in at least one case where the text alone was deemed sufficiently clear: 
The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called 
upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to 
them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the 
relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is 
an end of the matter. 
Competence of the General Assembly, supra note 24, at 8. But it has also appealed to travaux in 
other cases in order to confirm conclusions reached by other means. E.g., Convention of 1919 
Concerning the Work of Women at Night, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.AIB) No. 50, at 380; see generally 
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 608-09 {2d ed. 1973) (describing 
the ICJ's jurisprudence in this area). 
36. Reports supra note 25, at 204. 
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culled from supplementary sources. Ironically, to the extent that Articles 
31 and 32 admit ambiguity, the Convention's drafting and negotiation 
records plainly confirm this principle. During the Vienna Conference 
negotiations, the United States' chief delegate, Yale Law School 
Professor Myres McDougal, vigorously challenged the hierarchy of 
sources enshrined in Articles 31 and 32. In McDougal's view, this 
interpretive two-step processwould unnecessarily place states' actual 
negotiated agreements at risk: 
The rigid and restrictive system of articles [31] and [32] should 
not be made international law because it could be employed by 
interpreters to impose upon the parties to a treaty agreements that 
they had never made. The parties ... could well have a common 
intent quite different from that expressed by the "ordinary" 
meaning of the terms used in the text. The imposition upon the 
parties of certain alleged "ordinary" meanings ... could lead to the 
arbitrary distortion of their real intentions.37 
In place of the draft convention's "rigid and restrictive" hierarchy of 
sources, McDougal proposed a more flexible amendment that would 
give interpreters greater discretion in weighing a treaty's text vis-a-vis 
extrinsic sources. This amendment received scant support, however, 
from McDougal's peers at the Conference. Delegates from developing 
countries feared that broad reference to travaux would privilege wealthy 
nations capable of maintaining superior archives. 38 More importantly, 
delegates feared that this flexible approach would give treaty 
interpreters carte blanche to disregard clear, textual meanings in favor 
of spurious unilateralist interpretations. Uruguay's delegate offers a 
representative critique of McDougal's proposal: 
International law should avoid the idea of a "will of the parties" 
floating like a cloud over the terra firma of a contractual text. If 
respect for the wording of a treaty that had been signed and 
ratified was not something sacred, if the parties were to be 
allowed freely to invoke their supposed real will, an essential 
advantage ofwritten and conventional law would be lost.39 
The vast majority of countries represented at the Conference agreed that 
the original ILC draft should prevail since this predominately textualist 
approach-rather than the McDougal's more contextual 
37. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23, at 167-68; see also Official Records, 
Documents of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/C.I/L.I5 (I 969). 
38. Keamey & Dalton, supra note 21, at 520. 
39. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23 , at 170. 
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approach-offered a "neutral and fair formulation of the generally 
recognized canons of treaty interpretation."40 
In the end, the Conference decisively rejected McDougal's proposal 
by a vote of sixty-six nations against to eight nations in favor, with ten 
abstentions.41 When the Conference reconvened one year later, the ILC 
draft passed unanimously.42 
President Nixon transmitted the completed Convention to the Senate 
in 1971, stressing treaties' increasingly vital role in international 
governance and the need to support "well defined and readily 
ascertainable rules of international law applicable to the subject."43 The 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out a resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification, but conditioned this resolution upon a 
special understanding and interpretation with respect to Article 46. This 
article declares that states' failure to observe internal procedural 
requirements when concluding treaties does not invalidate a treaty for 
international purposes unless "that violation was manifest and 
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance."44 The 
Committee's proposed understanding qualified Article 46 to account for 
treaties' special constitutional status within U.S. law: 
[I]t is a rule of internal law of the United States of fundamental 
importance that no treaty (as defined by paragraph l(a) of Article 
2 of the Convention) is valid with respect to the United States, 
and the consent of the United States may not be given regarding 
any such treaty, unless the Senate of the United States has given 
its advice and consent to such treaty, or the terms of such treaty 
have been approved by law, as the case may be.45 
The State Department objected to the Committee's interpretation, 
fearing that it would cause other states to believe that the United States 
would no longer honor its preexisting congressional-executive 
agreements (agreements passed by a majority of both houses rather than 
a supermajority of the Senate) and pure executive agreements 
40. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 21, at 520. 
41. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23, at 185. 
42. Vienna Conference 2, supra note 23, at 57. To date, eighty-three countries have signed 
the Vienna Convention. Thirty-eight have formally ratified or acceded to the agreement. Vienna 
Convention, supra note 9, at 332. 
43. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences of Participation and 
Nonparticipation, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 277, 276 (1984) (remarks by Robert E. Dalton). 
44. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 46(1). "A violation is manifest if it would be 
objectively evident to any state conducting itself in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith." !d. art. 46(2). 
45. Dalton, supra note 43, at 276. 
HeinOnline  -- 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 443 2003-2004
2004] THE VIENNA CONVENTION 443 
(agreements concluded by the executive branch alone).46 The two sides 
made little progress in resolving this dilemma, and the resolution of 
advice and consent stalled in committee. On January 27, 1980, the 
Vienna Convention entered into force without U.S. ratification.47 To 
date, the United States remains a signatory to the Vienna Convention, 
but the Senate has yet to furnish the consent required for ratification 
under the Constitution. 
Although the Vienna Convention does not apply in the United States 
as a matter of domestic treaty law, many of the principles codified in the 
Convention have force nonetheless as expressions of customary 
international law.48 The Secretary of State's letter submitting the 
Convention to the Senate for formal ratification observed that although 
the Vienna Convention was "not yet in force," the document was 
nevertheless already "generally recognized as the authoritative guide to 
current treaty law and practice."49 In subsequent communications, the 
State Department has explained further that the Vienna Convention 
represents "a primary source of reference for determining ... the 
customary principles of treaty law,"50 which the Department consults 
"in dealing with day-to-day treaty problems."51 
When executive declarations affirm customary international norms, 
these norms naturally have claim to greater jurisprudential legitimacy in 
domestic courts. Indeed, even the most outspoken critics of 
contemporary customary international law generally accept that courts 
may apply these norms when they receive "authorization from the 
political branches."52 The State Department's representations in treaty 
transmittal letters, congressional hearings, and the like may not be 
legally binding to the same extent as formal executive orders 
46. Id. at 276-77. 
47. Vierdag, supra note 23, at 779. 
48. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary international law as 
"general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102 (stating that 
customary international law "results form general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them out of a sense of legal obligation"). 
49. Secretary of State Rogers' Report to the President, Oct. 18, 1971, 65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 
684,685 (1971). 
50. Dalton, supra note 43, at 278; see also S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971). 
51. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 65 AM. J. 
lNT'L L. 599,605 (1971). 
52. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique ofthe Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815,868,870 (1997) [hereinafter 
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique]. Whether Bradley and Goldsmith would recognize the Vienna 
Convention as customary international law in the absence of an express executive order is not, 
however, entirely clear. 
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promulgated by the President. Nevertheless, these declarations merit 
considerable respect as guides to the United States' general intent in 
treaty negotiations and as expert opinions regarding customary 
international treaty law's content. 
The State Department's acceptance of the Vienna Convention as an 
authoritative guide to customary international law also comports with 
the general principles that govern customary international law. Over the 
last half-century, quasi-universal conventions such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights53 and the United Nations Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)54 have blurred traditional distinctions 
between positive and customary international law. According to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), multilateral conventions such as 
these may reflect customary international law in three cases: First, a 
treaty provision may be "declaratory of pre-existing custom." Second, a 
treaty provision may "crystallize customary law in the process of 
formation." Third, a treaty provision may fall within the ambit of 
customary international law if it successfully "generates new customary 
law subsequent to its adoption."55 The ICJ embraced this last category 
most explicitly in The North Sea Cases: 
[A] norm creating provision which has constituted the foundation 
of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional or 
contractual in origin, has since passed into the general corpus of 
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio 
juris, [becomes] binding even for countries which have never, 
and do not, become parties to the Convention. 56 
Pursuant to these principles, the ICJ applies some multilateral 
53. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. N811 (1948). 
54. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, U.N. Doc. NConf.131L.52-L.55 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also President's Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1983 
Pub. Papers 378, 378 (Mar. 10, 1983) (announcing that the United States would honor UNCLOS 
and stating that the Convention contained "provisions with respect to the traditional uses of the 
oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interest 
of all states"). 
55. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL ., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 101 (1993). In 
fact, because international custom exists independent of treaties themselves, the provisions of a 
treaty that are not yet in force may constitute customary international law binding even on 
nonsignatories. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30 
(June 3) (applying provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as customary 
international law despite the fact that the Convention had not yet entered force between the 
parties). 
56. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 ICJ 3, 41 ~ 71 Feb. 
20). 
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conventions to signatories and non-signatories alike. 57 The status of 
customary international law "is not lightly to be regarded as having 
been attained," however; the ICJ generally refuses to enforce 
multilateral conventions against non-parties absent a showing that the 
relevant provisions satisfy both the generality and opinio juris 
requirements. 58 
U.S. courts also accept the principle that multilateral conventions 
may restate, crystallize, or progressively generate international 
custom. 59 The critical question for judicial determination is not whether 
a particular international agreement reflects preexisting international 
custom (although equivalence at the time of ratification would establish 
a strong presumption that the norm remains customary); rather, courts 
must decide whether, at the time of adjudication, convention provisions 
and customary practice coincide. As states conform their behavior to a 
convention's progressive principles, these principles may become 
binding even on those states that fail to ratify the convention. 60 
The ILC has confirmed that Articles 31-33 codify preexisting 
customary international law.61 Ian Brownlie, a member ofthe ILC for 
57. E.g., Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 7 (Mar. 21); North Sea Continental Shelf 
(F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Co., Ltd. (New Application 1962) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); S.S. Wimbledon, (Ger. 
v. UK, Fr., Italy, Japan), 1923 P.C.J.J. (ser. A) No. I, at 182 (Aug. 17). 
58. See Hiram Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction 
Between Treaty and International Law, 28 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 1041-42 (1995) (citing 
the ICJ's Asylum case (Columbia/Peru) and the North Sea Continental Shelf case (Federal 
Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands)). 
59. The Supreme Court's oft-cited 1900 decision, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900), relied upon several bilateral treaties as evidence of international maritime custom. !d. at 
687-88, 691. More recently, the Second Circuit's influential Filcirtiga decision suggested that 
conventions such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights "create[] an expectation of adherence, 
and 'insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, ... may by custom become 
recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States."' Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 
883 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting M.G.K. Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States 
Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816-17 (1978)); HowardS. Schrader, Note, Custom 
and General Principles as Sources of International Law in American Federal Courts, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 751, 762-63 (1982) (demonstrating that U.S. courts deduce customary international law 
from treaties). 
60. The Restatement recognizes this rule: "[C)odification of branches of international law by 
international bodies ... have provided authoritative text as a source for restatement of some 
topics." In fact, the Restatement specifically cites the Vienna Convention as a prime example of 
this phenomenon. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6. 
61. In theory, the ILC is required to employ differentiated procedures for the codification and 
progressive development of customary international law. While this bright-line procedural 
distinction does not always obtain in practice, the ILC often sends other signals to communicate 
whether it approaches its task in a particular instance as primarily to codify existing customary 
law or to progressively generate new custom. !d. at 78-79, 99. In drafting of Articles 31-33, the 
ILC clearly envisioned its role as codifying preexisting custom. 
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the drafting of Articles 31-33, explains that the Commission did not 
seek to develop new canons for treaty construction; instead, it sought 
only to isolate "the comparatively general principles which appear to 
constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties."62 For example, 
the Commission's decision to adopt a predominantly textualist approach 
reflected the customary practice recognized in numerous ICJ 
decisions. 63 Article 31's "ordinary meaning" canon reflected generally 
accepted practices identified years earlier by both the Institute of 
International Law64 and the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ).65 In short, rather than pioneer a progressive system for treaty 
interpretation, as the Restatement suggests, Articles 31-33 actually 
provided a comparatively skeletal guide to basic principles that were 
already well entrenched in customary international law. 
Numerous domestic, foreign, and international tribunals have 
recognized that the Vienna Convention codifies customary international 
treaty law. The ICJ invokes the Vienna Convention routinely,66 citing 
even some of its most controversial provisions as customary law and 
applying these principles to signatories and non-signatories alike.67 In 
Libya v. Chad,68 for example, the ICJ specifically emphasized Article 
31's customary status: 
The Court would recall that, in accordance with customary 
international law, reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object 
62. BROWNLIE, supra note 35, at 624. 
63. /d. 
64. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23, at 177. 
65 . BROWNLIE, supra note 35, at 626 (citing Advisory Opinion No. II, Polish Postal Service 
in Danzig, 1925 P.C.l .J. (ser. B.) No. II, 37, at 39 (May 16) (finding "a cardinal principle of 
interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their 
context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd")); Reports 
supra note 25, at 172, 185. 
66. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. and lr. v. Ice.), 1974 l.C.J. 3, at 14 (citing Article 52 
regarding agreements under threat of force); Advisory Opinion, Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 16, 47 (June 21) (discussing the Convention's provisions on treaty breach as 
reflecting customary international law). In fact, the ICJ has never found a provision of the Vienna 
Convention to be inconsistent with customary international law. AUST, supra note 34, at II. 
67. See France-United Kingdom: Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, 54 
Int'l L. Rep. 6; 18 l.L.M. 397 (1979). Courts recognize, however, that these canons operate only 
as residual defaults; treaty parties may freely abrogate the Vienna Convention by express 
agreement. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences of Participation 
and Nonparticipation, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 270, 272 (1984) (remarks by Sir. Ian 
Sinclair). 
68. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 ICJ 4, 16 (Feb. 3). 
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and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the 
text of the treaty. As a supplementary measure recourse may be 
had to means of interpretation such as the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.69 
447 
Most national and regional courts have followed the ICJ's lead, 
invoking the Convention "as an authoritative source of law, thus 
gradually transforming its innovative features into customary law 
through such application."70 The European Court of Human Rights, for 
example, chose to apply Articles 31-33 as "generally accepted 
principles of international law" well before the Vienna Convention even 
entered force. 71 Similarly, every American court to address the Vienna 
Convention's legal authority has concluded that its provisions express 
binding customary norms. 72 Notwithstanding the United States' failure 
to ratify the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts regularly apply Articles 31-
33 as customary law.73 
69. /d. at 21. 
70. LOUIS HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 416 ( 1993). 
71. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (serA) No.l8 (1975). 
72. E.g. , Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e apply the 
rules of customary international law enunciated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties"); Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000) 
("We ... treat the Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international law 
of treaties."); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing the Vienna Convention 's 
directive that treaty text "must be interpreted ' in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms . .. . "'); Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 
1296 n.40 (lith Cir. 1999) ("Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, 
it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying the international law 
of treaties.") (quoting Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th 
Cir. 1994)); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although the 
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the 
Vienna Convention as codifying the international law of treaties."); Haitian Centers Council v. 
Sale, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[P]rinciples of treaty construction are themselves codified, 
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties."); R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. Filanto 
Spa, 920 F. Supp. 1100 (D.Nev. 1996) ("The United States is not a signatory to the Vienna 
Convention; however, it has been a policy of the United States that Articles 31 and 32 are 
declaratory of customary international law, and will be so applied in the United States."); Logan 
v. Dupuis, 990 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Although the United States is not a party to the 
Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention (and 
specifically, Article 31) as codifying the customary international law of treaties."); Busby v. 
State, 40 P.3d 807 (Alaska App. 2002) ("[B]oth federal and state courts have acknowledged and 
employed the principles of interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention. We will too."); State 
v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 273 n.3 (N.M. 2001). 
73. E.g., Haitian Centers Council v. Sale, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Rather 
than having evolved from a judicial common law, ... principles of treaty construction are 
themselves codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties."); Gonzalez 
v. Guitierrez, 311 F.3d 942,949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While the United States is not a signatory 
to the Vienna Convention, it is the policy of the United States to apply articles 31 and 32 as 
customary international law."); Busby v. State, 40 P.3d 807 (AI. App. 2002) (applying Articles 31 
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In sum, the Vienna Convention's interpretive methodology is 
distinctive in several respects. First, Article 31 declares that courts must 
interpret treaty provisions "in good faith" according to their "ordinary 
meaning" and consistent with the treaty's broader "object and purpose." 
Unusual, subjective interpretations lack force unless other treaty 
partners ratify these interpretations by express agreement or consistent 
post-ratification practice.74 Second, the Convention enshrines a canon 
against interpretations in derogation of international law, presuming 
instead that states negotiate agreements against the backdrop of their 
preexisting international obligations. Third, when textualist and 
teleological readings leave a provision's meaning ambiguous, Article 32 
allows courts to seek additional illumination from a treaty's formal 
ratification record. Executive branch practice and general principles of 
international legal theory confirm the conclusion reached by numerous 
domestic, foreign, and international tribunals: Articles 31-33 of the 
and 32 as customary international law). 
A few commentators have questioned whether Articles 31-33 accurately reflect customary 
international law. The Restatement provides the preeminent example: 
Customary international law has not developed rules and modes of interpretation 
having the definiteness and precision to which [the Vienna Convention] aspires. 
Therefore, unless the Vienna Convention comes into force in the United States, [Articles 
31 through 33 do] not govern interpretation by the United States or by courts in the 
United States. But it represents generally accepted principles and the United States has 
already appeared willing to accept them despite differences in nuance and emphasis. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 325, cmt. (a). Maria Frankowska similarly asserts that "it is still 
debatable whether [Articles 31-33] simply codified the then existing customary law or whether 
they generated such law." Frankowska, supra note 16, at 332. These critics offer little support, 
however, for the proposition that customary international law lacks the Convention's 
"definiteness and precision" aside from the observation that U.S. courts have not uniformly 
followed the Vienna Convention's prescribed methodology. As the foregoing analysis 
demonstrates, there is compelling evidence that Articles 31-33 reflect customary international 
law. 
74. By the terms "subjective interpretation" and "subjective intent," I have in mind 
McDougal's suggestion that treaty texts and travaux preparatoires often inaccurately represent 
the negotiating parties' actual political bargains. "Subjective interpretations" may arise from 
allegations that negotiators' actual "meeting of the minds" produced special understandings that 
would be frustrated by strict enforcement of treaties' textual expression. States may also insist 
that treaties must be construed according to the unilateralist understanding of domestic political 
institutions (e.g., the President or Senate). Interpretations in the first category are "subjective" in 
the sense that they discount treaty text and accord heightened deference to states' unilateral 
interpretations. Interpretations in the second category share these qualities, but may also be 
"subjective" in the sense that they would distinguish treaties' domestic legal meaning from their 
meaning under foreign and international law. For a defense of this dualist approach, see Curtis A. 
Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589-90 (2003). "Objective interpretation," on the other hand, aims to 
establish as accurately as possible states' intent at the time of contracting as expressed in 
instruments and conduct accessible to all parties. 
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Vienna Convention represent binding canons of customary international 
law. 
B. The Nationalist and Internationalist Approaches 
Notwithstanding the Vienna Convention's customary status, U.S. 
courts have not consistently followed the Convention's interpretive 
framework. The Supreme Court has never relied upon the Vienna 
Convention as an authoritative source of law.75 A growing number of 
federal courts and two states recognize the Vienna Convention as an 
authoritative codification of customary treaty canons/6 but few 
recognize the degree to which the Convention's guidelines differ from 
U.S. practice. 
The Vienna Convention's imperfect assimilation into U.S. law 
reflects an unresolved conflict between two competing visions of 
domestic courts' institutional role in treaty-related litigation. One vision 
suggests that domestic courts take part in an international judicial 
system when they adjudicate treaty cases and bear a duty to interpret 
treaties according to internationally accepted standards. Another vision 
posits the judicial branch as a steward of national sovereignty entrusted 
with the responsibility to safeguard national legal norms and political 
preferences.77 Viewed from this latter perspective, treaties have force in 
domestic law only by virtue of the Constitution, and Article III 
courts-the oracles of American constitutional law-have inherent 
authority to develop parochial treaty canons even if these canons depart 
from customary international law. Whereas internationalist judges apply 
the Vienna Convention in order to facilitate transnational legal order, 
nationalist judges give the political branches maximum discretion to 
interpret and perform the United States' international obligations 
according to prevailing national political preferences. 
75. See discussion supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
76. See cases cited supra note 72. 
77. This nationalist/internationalist tension is a natural dynamic of international legal 
federalism and plays an important role in virtually every aspect of the United States' 
internalization of international norms. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
446-47 (1952) (describing the enduring tension between nationalist and internationalist traditions 
as "guided by ethical or political preferences" rather than "the science of law"); see, e.g., Curtis 
A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 529 (1999) (advocating a dualist approach to U.S. treaty practice, with special reference to 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Harold Hongju Koh, International Business 
Transactions in United States Courts, 261 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1996)(discerning this tension 
in international business transactions). 
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1. Should Courts Privilege Extrinsic Sources over Texts? 
Both the nationalist and internationalist approaches to treaty 
interpretation consider a court's main objective to be the identification 
and enforcement of parties' collective intent. These approaches proffer 
strikingly different methodologies, however, for ascertaining state 
intent. The nationalist approach-tracking contemporary American 
contract theory-seeks to identify party intent by drawing 
indiscriminately upon all available evidence of parties' respective 
expectations. The international approach, on the other hand, follows the 
Vienna Convention's injunction to focus on objective indicia of party 
intent such as treaty text and travaux preparatoires. 
General principles of contract law play a central role in both the 
nationalist and internationalist approaches.78 For centuries, leading 
publicists such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel characterized 
treaties as "public compacts" analogous to private contracts.79 The 
founding generation of American statesmen-themselves steeped in the 
great treatises of Grotius and Vattel-also frequently invoked general 
principles of private contract law to define and delimit the treaty power. 
Alexander Hamilton's famous explanation in Federalist No. 7 IS 
representative: 
The power of making treaties ... relates neither to the execution of 
the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones, and still less 
to an exertion of the common strength. Its objects are contracts 
with foreign nations, which have the force of law, but derive it 
from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed 
by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between 
sovereign and sovereign. 80 
Building upon this contract analogy, the contemporary nationalist 
approach encourages courts to develop common law treaty canons by 
incorporating principles from domestic contract law. "In interpreting an 
78. Professor David Bederman traces this private contract analogy in treaty interpretation to 
the earliest compacts among the Ancient Greek city-states. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CLASSICAL 
CANONS: RHETORIC, CLASSICISM AND TREATY INTERPRETATION 46-67 (200 I). 
79. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Ch. XV, § I (Louise R. Loomis trans., 
Walter J. Black 1949) (1625) (describing treaties as forms of contract); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, Ch. XVII, § 267-68 (Charles G. 
Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (analogizing treaty interpretation to contract interpretation); see also 
EUGENE RAFTOPOULOS, THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 84 (1990). Significantly, Grotius still supported the development of objective rules for 
treaty interpretation. BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 119. 
80. THE FEDERALIST NO.7 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McCellan eds., 
2001) (emphasis added). 
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international treaty," the Supreme Court proclaimed in Societe 
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 81 "we are 
mindful that it is 'in the nature of a contract between nations ... to which 
[g]eneral rules of construction apply. "'82 Because judges are often 
unfamiliar with foreign contract law, recourse to "general rules" of 
contract law inevitably reflects an American-law bias. 
Among the more important "general rules" that U.S. courts have 
drawn from domestic contract law is the modem parol evidence rule. 
The parol evidence rule conceptualizes contract texts as mere symbolic 
expressions of parties' actual intent. It recognizes that a treaty's text 
often provides the best evidence of parties' actual intentions but 
encourages courts to consult extrinsic sources liberally to pinpoint party 
intent as accurately as possible. When courts decide that an agreement's 
textual expression does not accurately reflect the parties' actual, 
unformalized intentions, courts give parties' subjective intent 
precedence over their objective representations.83 
81. 482 u.s. 522 (1987). 
82. !d. at 533 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253, 
262 (1984)); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A treaty is essentially a contract between or among sovereign 
nations."); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) ("[T]reaties are contracts between 
independent nations .... "); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921) ("Writers of authority agree 
that treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts 
in writing between individuals ... with a view to making effective the purposes of the high 
contracting parties .... "); Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) ("[A] 
treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land ... but also an agreement among 
sovereign powers"); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979); Harris v. US, 768 F.2d 1240, 1242 (lith Cir. 1985) 
("International agreements should be construed more like contracts than statutes."). 
83. John A. Townsend, Tax Treaty Interpretation, 55 TAX LAW 219, 239-40 (2001). 
Interestingly, the parol evidence rule first entered U.S. treaty jurisprudence through an Indian 
treaty case-the Supreme Court's 1943 decision, Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 
U.S. 423 (1943)--rather than a case involving a treaty with a foreign nation. Construing a treaty 
between the United States and the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes, the Supreme Court offered the 
following dictum: 
[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their 
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the 
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties. 
!d. at 431-32. Although courts have read this passage broadly to apply to all U.S. treaties, the 
Supreme Court originally designed the liberal use of extrinsic sources as a response to Indian 
treaties' unique deficiencies. By softening its traditional textualist approach in this context, the 
Choctaw Nation Court attempted to compensate for the United States' disproportionate 
bargaining power in treaty negotiations with Indian tribes, the obvious disparities in negotiating 
skills and legal expertise, and language barriers that prevented tribes from critically evaluating 
treaty texts. Anthony A. Lusvardi, Note, Montana v. United States-Effects on Liberal Treaty 
Interpretation and Indian Rights to Land Underlying Navigable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME 
LAWYER 689, 690-91 ( 1982). Recognizing that the United States might easily manipulate treaty 
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One court describes this rule's operation in treaty construction thus: 
The basic aim of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the intent of 
the parties who have entered into agreement, in order to construe 
the document in a manner consistent with that intent. ... We must 
therefore examine all available evidence of the shared 
expectations of the parties to this Convention in order to answer 
the interrelated questions [raisedJ_B4 
By widening the scope of judicial investigation beyond the four 
comers of a treaty's text, the parol evidence rule aims to "facilitat[e] the 
ability of private parties to reach voluntary bargains through 
manifesting shared understandings, and [to] limit[] judges' ability to 
frustrate these bargains through 'objective' interpretations. "'85 An 
agreement's "ordinary meaning" may serve as the starting point for 
judicial investigation, but this ceremonial symbol of the parties' 
agreement represents only one of several factors under judicial 
consideration. 86 
Numerous cases witness the parol evidence rule's recent 
entrenchment in U.S. treaty jurisprudence. Consider, for example, the 
Supreme Court's 1986 decision, 0 'Connor v. United States,87 which 
provisions to tribes' prejudice, the Supreme Court departed from its previous textualist baseline in 
order to protect tribes' actual expectations. 
The Court's extension of Choctaw Nation to the interpretation of treaties with foreign nations 
represents one of the great ironies in U.S. foreign affairs law. When domestic courts interpret 
international agreements today, they typically invoke Choctaw Nation to rationalize increasing 
the federal government's influence, rather than to correct for the United States' disproportionate 
bargaining power in negotiations with other nation-states. 
84. Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1962) (emphasis added). 
85. Stephen Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modem Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for 
New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 207 (1998). 
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at 200 n.4. One commentator offers the following 
observation: 
The courts of most countries interpret international agreements in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the text of the agreement; the object and purpose of the agreement 
is merely ancillary, casting light on the ordinary meaning. The courts of the United 
States, however, have a distinctly different approach to interpretation. The ordinary 
meaning of words is for American courts merely one of the factors to be taken into 
account in the interpretive process. The prime objective of interpretation by American 
courts is to ascertain the meaning intended by the parties. 
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW (Jacobs and Roberts eds., 1987). 
87. 479 U.S. 27 (1986). Other treaty cases, which support liberal use of extrinsic sources, 
include Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 84 (1993) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991); Vo1kswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988); and Air France v. Sacks, 470 U.S. 392, 
396 (1985). 
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examined whether the Panama Canal Treatl8 immunized American 
citizens employed in Panama by the Panama Canal Commission from 
U.S. tax laws. The petitioners in 0 'Connor relied upon the plain 
meaning of Article XV, Section 2 of the Panama Canal Treaty, which 
specifically exempted U.S. citizen employees and their dependents 
"from any taxes, fees or other charges on income received as a result of 
their work for the Commission."89 Conceding that the Treaty offered 
textual evidence to support extending U.S. tax law to the petitioners, a 
unanimous Court-in an opinion authored, ironically, by Justice 
Scalia-focused on "the contextual case for limiting Article XV to 
Panamanian taxes. "90 Among the contextual evidence, the Court cited 
pieces of negotiation history introduced by the government, including 
the State Department's internal treaty drafts and post-ratification 
interpretations by the executive branch.91 These documents were not 
among the official travaux prepared by the parties simultaneously with 
the drafting of the Treaty itself; on the contrary, the petitioners' brief 
suggests that this negotiating history was "contrived by the 
government" some time later "to further its interests in litigation."92 
Although the Vienna Convention discourages reference to internal 
memoranda and drafts such as these, the Court consulted these sources 
pursuant to the parole evidence rule. 
The parol evidence rule's assimilation into U.S. treaty interpretation 
has three major consequences: First, the rule significantly erodes the 
age-old presumption that a treaty's text most accurately reflects treaty 
parties' intent. "In foreign affairs," notes Professor Louis Henkin, "the 
Supreme Court has authoritatively declared the text to be incomplete 
and inadequate."93 When expectations conflict with the treaty's clear 
text, courts privilege the agreement's spirit over its textual expression.94 
88. Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., T.I.A.S. No. 10030. 
89. !d. art. XV, § 2 (emphasis added). The petitioners argued that the court must enforce this 
provision domestically pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 894(a), which declares that "[i]ncome of any kind, 
to the extent required by any treaty obligation of the United States, shall not be included in gross 
income and shall be exempt from taxation .... " O'Connor, 479 U.S. at 30. 
90. O'Connor, 479 U.S. at 31. As Justice Scalia's 0 'Connor opinion demonstrates, 
nationalism and textualism are often difficult to reconcile in the treaty context. 
91. !d. at 33 (citing Letter from John L. Haines, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Panama Canal 
Commission, to David Slacter, United States Department of Justice, Dec. 20, 1982, pp. 2-3, I 
App. in Nos. 85-504, 85-505, 85-506, and 85- 507 (CA Fed.), at 61-62; United States draft of§ 2 
of Art. XV, I App. in Nos. 85- 504, 85-505, 85-506, and 85-507 (CA Fed.), at 74). 
92. BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 271. 
93. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 73 (1990). 
94. E.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989) (providing no more than a passing 
reference to a treaty's text before invoking Choctaw Nation as a basis for resting its decision 
almost exclusively on domestic ratification materials); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 
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Second, the parol evidence rule institutionalizes a multifactor judicial 
inquiry, in which no particular interpretive source a priori receives 
greater weight or credibility than any other source. Courts explore the 
full panoply of sources at their disposal-from internal diplomatic 
memoranda to unilateral press releases-and accord weight to these 
sources on an ad hoc basis.95 
Third, the parol evidence rule substantially enhances the executive 
branch's influence in judicial treaty interpretation. As an actual treaty 
signatory with access to the full negotiating record and other 
documents, executive agencies have an inherent evidentiary advantage 
in litigation involving private parties. The United States' extensive 
archival system provides another obvious advantage vis-a-vis 
developing countries-a concern specifically raised by delegates at the 
Vienna Conference.96 In addition, the vast array of negotiating materials 
available for judicial consideration (including purely domestic materials 
not included in the travaux preparatoires) arguably increase courts' 
freedom to promote domestic interests to the detriment of foreign treaty 
parties. "The Rehnquist Court cases do not provide any objective means 
for selecting among [extrinsic] sources," one commentator complains. 
"Once a court moves from the treaty's text, and its immediate orbit of 
structural context, it is left in a void in which it is simply free to use the 
materials which accord with the preferred result sought."97 
Focusing on parties' subjective intent need not lead inexorably to 
pro-forum bias; in theory, courts might invoke the parol evidence rule to 
preserve party autonomy and correct for the United States' 
disproportionate bargaining power in international treaty negotiation. In 
practice, however, courts typically employ parol evidence to effectuate 
executive agencies' subjective interpretations of international 
agreements-notwithstanding conflicting representations from foreign 
treaty partners. 
457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (holding that although "[t]he clear import of treaty language" 
presumptively "controls," courts may disregard agreements' textual expression if "application of 
the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the 
intent or expectations of its signatories" (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 
(1963)); see also THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 165 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley 
Richards eds., 1987) (observing that subjective intent often trumps clear text in U.S. treaty 
interpretation). 
95. See, e.g., Denby v. Seaboard World Airlines, 575 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1983) 
("The Second Circuit has frequently indicated that language is merely one relevant consideration 
in interpreting the Warsaw Convention .... The fundamental consideration in treaty interpretation 
is to effectuate the treaty's evident purposes." (internal quotations omitted)). 
96. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
97. BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 289. 
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Although the Supreme Court continues to apply the parol evidence 
rule, the Vienna Convention's holistic textualist approach has 
experienced a modest revival in lower federal and state courts. As 
discussed previously, the Vienna Convention dictates that courts 
identify parties' objective intent as conveyed by a treaty's "ordinary 
meaning" and its manifest "object and purpose."98 Travaux 
preparatoires serve as ancillary interpretive guides,99 but Article 31 
cautions adjudicators to avoid imbuing treaty terms with unusual, 
subjective meanings unless the treaty parties collectively ratify these 
interpretations. 100 Courts consider negotiating history only as 
supplementary support for provisions' plain meaning or for assistance in 
cases where a provision's text, in isolation, yields an "absurd or 
unreasonable" result, 101 and they avoid reliance on internal ratification 
materials-including contemporaneous representations from U.S. 
negotiators. 102 Like the nationalist approach captured in 0 'Connor, the 
Vienna Convention permits courts to consider a treaty's travaux 
preparatoires; but unlike the nationalist approach, the Convention 
safeguards treaty texts as the preeminent authority in judicial treaty 
interpretation. 103 
2. Should Courts Ignore the United States' Other International 
Obligations? 
A second critical difference between the Vienna Convention's 
interpretive guidelines and the nationalist approach is their respective 
receptivity toward international law as a guide to treaty interpretation. 
The Vienna Convention requires treaty interpreters to take into account 
"any relevant rules of international law applicable to relations between 
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31 (1); see also International Law Commission 
Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 27 U.N. Doc. N5809 
(1964) (affirming that "the text [of a treaty] must be presumed to be the authentic expression of 
the intention of the parties"). 
99. !d. 
100. !d. art. 31 (3)-( 4). 
101. !d. art. 32. The Restatement suggests that, in practice, international courts have varied in 
their willingness to look beyond treaty text to travaux preparatoires. RESTATEMENT, supra note 
6, at 199. 
102. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31-32. 
103. This conflict between the Vienna Convention approach and the traditional U.S. approach 
closely mirrors traditional debates over courts' resort to parol evidence in contract interpretation 
generally. See generally Ross & Tranen, supra note 85 (describing the U.S. evolution from an 
objective theory of contract interpretation to modern subjectivist approaches); Joseph M. Perillo, 
The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 427 (2000) (describing the objectivism/subjectivism dialectic as a recurrent theme in 
contract jurisprudence). 
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the parties. " 104 Courts that apply the Vienna Convention construe 
treaties against the broader context of states' obligations under 
international law. If a treaty provision has two reasonable 
constructions-one that undermines a party's international obligations 
and another that is consistent with these obligations-courts presume 
that treaty partners intend to comply with international law. 
This provision essentially extends a common law rule that U.S. courts 
apply routinely in statutory interpretation. 105 "It has been a maxim of 
statutory construction since the decision in Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy," the Supreme Court proclaimed in Weinberger v. 
Rossi, "that 'an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the laws of nations, if any other possible construction remains. "' 106 Just 
as the Charming Betsy canon instructs courts to presume that Congress 
intends to avoid conflicts with international law, the Vienna Convention 
encourages courts to read treaties against the backdrop of international 
law unless parties explicitly signal otherwise. 
In the past, U.S. courts have accepted the Vienna Convention's 
presumption that international agreements should not be construed in 
derogation of international law. 107 Recent cases such as United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain108 suggest this internationalist presumption may be 
losing force, however. In its brief to the Supreme Court, Alvarez-
Machain's counsel contended that cross-border abductions were "so 
104. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c). This provision codifies a principle of 
customary international law long recognized by courts and scholars alike. See, e.g., Reparation 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. II); 
Advisory Opinion No. 15, Jurisdiction of Courts of Danzig 1928 P.C.I.J.(ser. B) No. l5 (Mar. 3); 
Advisory Opinion No. 10, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 
10, at 20 (Feb. 21); D.P. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (2d ed. 1970). 
105. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
106. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (internal quotation omitted) (citation 
omitted). In the second half of the twentieth century, courts retreated from the analogous 
presumption that courts should interpret legislation narrowly to minimize derogation from 
common law rules. See, e.g .. lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("The rule 
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such an 
adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly 
intended to be given to the measure." (quoting Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 
(1930)). However, common law principles still play a significant role in statutory interpretation 
today. See, e.g .. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (using the common law of torts to deduce the 
types of damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
107. See, e.g .. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30,40 (1931) (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs, 
133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890), for the proposition that treaties are to be construed in reference to their 
meaning under the "law of nations"); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20, 429 
(1886) (presuming that treaty parties did not intend for the provisions of an extradition treaty to 
depart from the parties ' preexisting rights under intemationallaw). 
108. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655. 
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clearly prohibited in international law" that the treaty parties had no 
reason to draft a clause expressly prohibiting this conduct. 109 Amicus 
briefs from the Mexican and Canadian foreign ministries and from 
numerous specialists in international law supported this construction. 110 
Nevertheless, six justices flatly rejected this view, 111 concluding that the 
treaty did not implicitly incorporate customary international norms: 
"The Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if, as respondent 
asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it 
on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice 
of one nation to the other nation."112 International law might supplement 
positive law under some circumstances, Alvarez-Machain implies, but 
courts should not read customary norms into international accords.113 
The First Circuit's 1997 decision, United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 114 
also aptly illustrates the nationalist impulse to subordinate the United 
States' international obligations to transitory foreign-policy interests. In 
December 1995, the United States apprehended Lui Kin-Hong in 
Boston's Logan Airport and announced its intention to extradite him to 
Hong Kong to stand trial on bribery charges. 115 Lui challenged Hong 
Kong's extradition request on the grounds that Hong Kong would be 
unable to try his case before its reversion to the People's Republic of 
China. By extraditing Lui to Hong Kong for prosecution, the defendant 
argued, the United States would violate Article XII of its extradition 
treaty with Hong Kong, which provided that "a person extradited shall 
109. Brief for Respondent at II, United States v. Alvarez-Machain. 
II 0. See, e.g, Brief for the United States of Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance, Brief of the Government of Canada in Support of Respondent, Brief for Amicus 
Curiae and Real Party in Interest Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, 1991 U.S. Briefs 712 (1992). 
II I. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666 ("The international censure of international 
abductions is further evidenced, according to respondent, by the United Nations Charter and the 
Charter of the Organization of American States."). 
112. Jd. at 667 . 
113. Cf Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 
YALE L.J. 2277, 2282 (1994) ("[I]nternational law can be used to supplement existing law. Here 
the use of international law is apparently consistent with the decisions of the executive branches; 
international law fills an area that domestic law has left blank"). Justice Blackmun later criticized 
Alvarez-Machain for "ignor[ing] its first principles and constru[ing] the challenged treaty directly 
contrary to the opinions of mankind." Justice Harry Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law 
of Nations: Owing a Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, I 04 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1994). 
The Supreme Court's construction of the UN Refugee Convention in the Haitian refugee case, 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. !55 (1993), showed similar disregard for international 
law as a substantive guide in treaty interpretation. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti 
Paradigm " in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2416-19 (1994) 
(describing the Court's failure to respect international law in Haitian Centers Council). 
114. 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997). 
115. ld. at 107. 
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not ... be extradited by that Party to a third State." 116 Underpinning the 
treaty's plain language were customary norms-codified in the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties-which 
require that "a change in sovereignty brought about when one sovereign 
state is ceded and becomes part of the territory of another preexisting 
state ... generally terminates the effect of treaties of the predecessor state 
with respect to the territory in question." 117 
The district court accepted this construction of the statute and 
released Lui on bail, but the First Circuit ordered Lui returned to 
custody and cleared the way for his extradition to Hong Kong-and, 
ultimately, to China. According to a majority of the three-judge panel, 
the treaty should be construed in a manner that "produce[ s] reciprocity 
between, and expanded rights on behalf of, the signatories .... 'For that 
reason, if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the 
rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the 
more liberal construction is to be preferred. "'118 Ignoring customary 
international law, the court narrowed the Article XII limitation and 
reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus. 
The Vienna Convention rejects the nationalist presumption that treaty 
parties draft international agreements on a tabula rasa. One country's 
legal duty to respect another's territorial sovereignty does not evaporate, 
the Convention suggests, simply because the two sign an extradition 
agreement. Instead, the Convention presumes that states negotiate and 
conclude agreements against the backdrop of their preexisting 
obligations under customary international law just as U.S. courts 
presume that Congress passes legislation against the backdrop of 
domestic common law. To the extent that the Convention permits courts 
to construe states' rights "liberally," Article 31 (3)( c) of the Vienna 
Convention dictates that states' other international obligations mark the 
116. /d. at 122 (citing Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, *12, as 
amended June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., T.l.A.S. No. 12050, art. XII(l)(a)-(b)). 
117. United States v. Kin-Hong, No. 97-1084, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7587, *33 (Stahl, J., 
dissenting) (citing the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 15 
U.N. Doc. NCONF. 80/31 (1978), 72 AM . 1. INT'L L. 971 (1978)). The United States is not a 
signatory to this Convention, it is nevertheless widely recognized to express the customary 
international law on this subject. See id. at *33 n.IO (noting that "the Convention [on Succession] 
is ... viewed as an authoritative statement of the rule governing the succession of states under 
public international law"); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (1987) (noting that although the Convention on Succession "is not yet 
in force ... many of its provisions codify the customary intemationallaw on the subject"). 
118. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 110 (quoting Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 
(1993), and United States v. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1330 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
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outer limits of this discretionary zone. 119 
3. Should Courts Always Defer to the Executive Branch? 
A third salient distinction between the nationalist and internationalist 
approaches is the degree of deference that each accords executive 
interpretations of ambiguous treaties. In theory, U.S. courts "interpret 
treaties for themselves."120 In practice, however, judges rarely adopt 
interpretations that conflict with the views expressed by the State 
Department and other executive agencies. While not formally 
"conclusive," the Supreme Court has held that "the meaning attributed 
to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their 
negotiation and implementation is entitled to great weight." 121 
Over the last two decades, the Court's deference to executive treaty 
interpretations has come to signify a virtual presumption of accuracy, 
which opposing litigants may rebut only by furnishing exceptionally 
strong counterevidence (e.g., proof that a proposed interpretation rests 
on fundamentally faulty logic). 122 Alvarez-Machain demonstrates that 
the Court will follow these executive interpretations even when treaty 
partners provide conflicting representations regarding their own specific 
intent and expectations. As Professor Bederman has observed, "Judicial 
deference to the Executive's position is the single best predictor of 
interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases."123 
The Supreme Court's extraordinary deference to executive agencies 
in treaty cases represents a nationalist adaptation of a customary 
principle common to both the nationalist and internationalist 
approaches: the canon of "liberal interpretation." This general principle 
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c). An apt analogy is the concept of "margin 
of appreciation" in European Union law, which allows regional interpreters to interpret EU 
treaties liberally, provided that these interpretations do not breach other relevant norms. 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976). 
120. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 
326 ("Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement for 
purposes of applying it as law in the United States ... "). 
121. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 457 U.S. at 184-85. 
122. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1986). 
123. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
953, 1015 (1994); see also Bush, supra note 8, at 956 (discussing three "choreographed steps" in 
judicial treaty interpretation: "(1) acknowledging that deference to the political branches is the 
prevailing rule; (2) refusing to defer in this specific case, noting that the leading statement on 
deference to the political branches, Baker v. Carr, does not require it; and (3) affirming the 
Executive Branch claims after looking at the case on its merits."). U.S. courts may not be unique 
in their systematic bias toward national interests. See MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE 
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 259 (1967) ("[N]ational judges 
appear to have voted for the position championed by their country about 80 percent of the time."). 
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(applied expansively in Kin-Hong) declares that, in the absence of 
affirmative treaty obligations, jus cogens norms, or customary 
international law "[ r ]estrictions upon the independence of States 
cannot. .. be presumed."124 As the Permanent Court of International 
Justice explained, "If the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in 
choosing between several admissible interpretations, the one which 
involves the minimum obligations for the Parties should be adopted."125 
Thus, within certain limits, international law allows interpreters to adopt 
treaty constructions that minimize the parties' contractual obligations. 126 
In several cases, the Supreme Court has characterized this canon of 
liberal construction as a presumption favoring expansive interpretations 
of states' rights under treaties and disfavoring interpretations that 
restrict state sovereignty. "Treaties are to be construed in a broad and 
liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive 
of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable of them, 
the latter is to be preferred."127 Viewed through a nationalist lens, the 
decision to construe treaty provisions in a "broad and liberal spirit" 
favors deference to executive agencies' reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous treaty provisions, since this approach inhibits courts from 
burdening the United States with gratuitous international obligations. 
While this nationalist approach has some intuitive appeal, it suffers 
from two major flaws. First, construing the United States' rights 
"liberally" often induces courts to restrict a treaty partner's rights under 
international law. In Alvarez-Machain, for example, the Supreme Court 
invoked the canon of "liberal construction" as a basis for construing the 
United States' sovereign rights under the U.S.-Mexico Extradition 
Treaty liberally (allowing cross-border abductions by U.S. law 
enforcement). The Court devoted little attention, however, to the fact 
that this "liberal" construction implied a correspondingly stingy 
construction of Mexico's territorial rights. By deferring to the State 
Department's interpretation, the Supreme Court sent a message to other 
treaty partners that, in U.S. courts, some sovereign interests are more 
sovereign than others. 
124. S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). But see Martin A. 
Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of 
International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 559 (1996) (arguing that "the time has come to 
reexamine" this approach). 
125. Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 25 (Nov. 21). 
126. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 85 (4th ed. 1996) 
(describing the canon ofliberal interpretation in teleological terms). 
127. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1923). 
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Second, deference to "liberal" executive treaty interpretations may 
prejudice private parties and other nation-states, which act in reliance 
upon a treaty's objective meaning. A paradigmatic example is Sale v. 
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 128 In Haitian Centers Council, the 
Supreme Court considered whether forced repatriations of Haitian 
refugees apprehended in international waters by the United States Coast 
Guard violated the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention). 129 Article 33(1) of the Refugee 
Convention contains the following general prohibition: 
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 130 
Rather than read this provision at face value to proscribe the 
refugees' "return" to Haiti, the Supreme Court deferred to the United 
States' interpretation and construed the term "return" ("refouler") 
narrowly to contain an express geographic limitation. The Court argued 
that any attempt to apply this prohibition extraterritorially to persons 
apprehended on the high seas would unjustifiably limit U.S. 
sovereignty. Ironically, however, the Court's expansive reading of the 
United States' sovereign rights under the Refugee Convention 
significantly diminished the rights of the refugees themselves-the very 
persons that the Convention was designed to protect. As Justice 
Blackmun argued in a stinging dissent, this so-called "liberal 
interpretation" undermined the Convention's core purpose by "driving" 
the refugees "back to detention, abuse, and death."131 Repatriating the 
refugees may have served United States' immediate foreign-policy 
interests, but it required a highly improbable construction of Article 
33( 1) viewed in light of its "ordinary meaning" and "object and 
purpose. "132 
The Supreme Court's deference to executive agencies in treaty cases 
draws most attention in political hot-button cases like Haitian Centers 
Council and Alvarez-Machain, but it plays a powerful role in less 
politically-sensitive cases as well. Most of the Supreme Court's treaty 
128. 509 u.s. 155 (1993). 
129. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33(1), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 
6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176. 
130. !d. 
131. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. at 208. 
132. !d. at 169, 191. 
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cases over the last quarter-century have involved civil actions brought 
under the Warsaw Convention, which governs carrier liability for 
"bodily injur[ies]" incurred in the course of "international 
transportation."133 Unlike Haitian Centers Council and Alvarez-
Machain, these bread-and-butter Warsaw Convention cases are hardly 
the political powder keg cases that test the judiciary's capacity to deal 
impartial justice. Nevertheless, of the seven Warsaw Convention cases 
that reached the Supreme Court over the last twenty years, the Supreme 
Court accepted the government's position in every case but one. 134 
Not surprisingly, the Vienna Convention rejects the nationalist 
approach's extraordinarily deferential attitude toward executive treaty 
interpretations. Although the Convention does not address the issue 
directly, it prohibits courts from imposing any "special meaning" on 
treaty terms unless Articles 31-33 "establishtJ that the parties so 
intended."135 Only those national instruments that are "accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty" fall within the 
Vienna Convention framework. 136 "Subsequent agreement[s]" and 
"subsequent [state] practice [with respect to] ... the application of [a] 
treaty" are admissible only if they clearly establish the parties' shared 
agreement. 137 
Taken as a whole, these provisions suggest that courts should not 
accord heightened deference to any particular state (including the home 
forum) in treaty cases. International law might empower courts to 
construe treaty provisions "liberally" where necessary to avoid 
unreasonable restrictions on national sovereignty. It might also permit 
U.S. courts to give executive treaty interpretations limited deference 
according to agencies' unique expertise and their potential to further 
transnational uniformity. Nevertheless, the Vienna Convention clearly 
does not anticipate that courts will exercise this deference as liberally as 
133. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. I, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (note following 49 U.S.C. § 
40105). 
134. The only case in which the Rehnquist Court has rejected the United States' interpretation 
of a treaty is Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989), where the Court found the 
government's reasoning to be fundamentally logically defective. In all other cases-including the 
other six Warsaw Convention cases-the Court adopted the government's position. El AI Israel 
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Dooley v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 524 
U.S. 116 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217 (1996); Eastern Airlines, 
Inc., v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984). 
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(4). 
136. !d. art. 31(2)(b). 
137. !d. art. 31(3)(a)-(b). 
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many U.S. courts have done in the past; in fact, the Convention 
implicitly cautions courts against exercising this discretion in a manner 
that contradicts a treaty's purpose or undermines the proper symmetry 
of rights and obligations between treaty partners. 
C. Surveying the Great Divide 
As this part has shown, the nationalist and internationalist approaches 
differ in three fundamental respects: First, although both the approaches 
seek to effectuate parties' "shared expectations," the nationalist 
approach places greater emphasis on extrinsic sources as evidence of 
subjective state intent. Second, the Vienna Convention presumes that 
international law informs states' expectations regarding their treaty 
obligations, but the nationalist approach rejects this presumption. Third, 
the nationalist approach accords "great weight" to the executive 
agencies' treaty interpretations, while the internationalist approach 
discourages courts from privileging a single treaty party's 
uncorroborated ex post representations. 
From an internationalist perspective, the nationalist canons applied in 
cases like Kin-Hong, Alvarez-Machain, and Haitian Centers Council 
epitomize the United States' dysfunctional internalization of its 
international commitments. These decisions do not call into question 
U.S. courts' competency to apply international treaty law so much as 
they cast doubt on courts' commitment to international treaty law. While 
the Rehnquist Court has not gone so far as to declare treaty 
interpretation a nonjusticiable political question, its nationalist approach 
effectively immunizes most executive treaty interpretations from legal 
challenge. 138 
Viewed from a nationalist perspective, however, the Supreme Court's 
deference to executive agencies and its diminished respect for 
international customary norms reflect the executive's superior expertise 
and political accountability in foreign affairs. Minimal judicial 
interference in domestic treaty compliance safeguards U.S. sovereignty 
and prevents judges from compromising sensitive or (perhaps) secret 
diplomatic understandings. 
Of course, in the vast majority of cases, courts will likely arrive at 
comparable outcomes by following either the nationalist approach or the 
internationalist approach. As legal realists have demonstrated, formal 
method is an imprecise gauge for predicting the outcome of specific 
138. Cf Koh, supra note 113, at 2434-35 (describing this tendency in foreign affairs law 
generally). 
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cases. Indeed, even the Vienna Convention's drafters recognized that, 
despite their efforts to standardize treaty interpretation through the 
Vienna Convention, "[t]he interpretation of documents is to some extent 
an art, not an exact science."139 
Nevertheless, while differences between the nationalist approach and 
the Vienna Convention "should not be exaggerated" (as the Restatement 
justly cautions), 140 the foregoing case studies suggest that differences 
may, in fact, generate conflicting results in a significant set of cases. 141 
As courts become more familiar with the Vienna Convention's 
interpretive regime, this conflict is likely to intensify. 
II. THE NATIONALIST AND INTERNATIONALIST PARADIGMS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Before turning to the merits of the nationalist and internationalist 
approaches, it may be useful to retrace the paths by which they 
diverged. In theory, the principle that U.S. courts should derive treaty 
canons from customary international law-a principle I will refer to as 
the "internationalist paradigm"-has long enjoyed a dominant position 
in U.S. treaty practice. For centuries, U.S. courts have recognized that 
they must interpret treaties according to internationally authoritative 
canons rather than fashion their own common law treaty canons-an 
alternative I will call the "nationalist paradigm." Although 
contemporary common law treaty canons differ from the Vienna 
Convention's internationalist canons in certain respects, these 
differences are not an inevitable outgrowth of U.S. constitutional or 
statutory law. Instead, this part shows that the contemporary nationalist 
tradition originally developed as a contingent internationalist response 
to a global jurisprudential crisis. 
A. The Internationalist Paradigm: First Principles 
Since the United States' inception, U.S. courts repeatedly have 
rejected the proposition that parochial treaty canons should supplant 
customary international canons. Instead, when domestic courts 
139. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its 17th Session and 
on its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 218, U.N. Doc. N6309/Rev.l. 
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 325 n.4. 
141. See BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 240 ("Now, more than ever, there is a conflict 
between U.S. practice and more 'international' approaches to treaty interpretation .... This schism 
in method has been well-documented, and judges in the United States are more frequently 
realizing that the approach taken by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may lead to 
interpretive outcomes very different than those suggested by .. .litigants."). 
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adjudicate cases with transnational elements, they become "court[s] of 
all the nations of the world, because all persons, in every part of the 
world, are concluded by [their] sentences." 142 
The Framers clearly anticipated that the law of nations would play an 
integral role in domestic law, by providing independent rules of 
decision and clothing the Constitution's bare bones in flesh. John Jay, 
the Supreme Court's first Chief Justice, noted that the country "had, by 
taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the 
law of nations." 143 Just as international law illuminates constitutional, 
statutory, and common law adjudication, U.S. courts anticipated that the 
law of nations would inform the treaty power's substantive scope and 
practical operation. "The subject of treaties ... is to be determined by 
the law of nations," the Supreme Court affirmed in 1796. 144 Decades 
later, in Holden v. Joy, 145 the Court sharpened this point: 
Express power is given to the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds 
of the senators present concur, and inasmuch as the power is 
given .. . it must be assumed that the framers of the Constitution 
intended that it should extend to all those objects which in the 
intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper 
subjects of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the 
nature of our government and the relations between States and 
the United States. 146 
Although the law of nations might not speak directly to all questions 
regarding the "proper subject of negotiation and treaty," the Court 
appreciated that it would furnish many rules of decision for judicial 
application. 
More important for present purposes, U.S. courts have long 
recognized that international law not only circumscribes the treaty 
power's scope but also provides the principles by which courts must 
interpret treaties. 147 As Justice Story emphasized in 1817, "the law of 
142. Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. 54, 91 (1795); see also Rose v. Himely, 8 
U.S. 241, 277 (1808) (defending the fundamental "principle" that "the law of nations is the law of 
all tribunals in the society of nations, and is supposed to be equally understood by all."). 
143. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Da11.) 419,474 (1793). 
144. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796). 
145. 84 U.S. 211 (17 Wall.)(l872). 
146. !d. at 242-43 (emphasis added); see also De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) 
("That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between 
our government and the governments of other nations is clear."). 
147. The law of treaties traditionally constituted a subdivision of the customary international 
"law of states." Due to Americans' "disillusioning experience" under the Articles of 
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nations is always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties."148 
Chief Justice Jay expressly affirmed this principle at the celebrated 1849 
trial of Gideon Henfield: 
Whenever doubts and questions arise relative to the validity, 
operation, or construction of treaties, or of any articles in them, 
those doubts and questions must be settled according to the 
maxims and principles of the law of nations applicable to the 
case. 149 
Because treaties operate on the international plane, municipal courts 
must apply international interpretive canons "whenever doubts and 
questions arise" in domestic treaty construction. Consistent with this 
principle, U.S. courts traditionally identified and applied international 
canons in resolving treaty-related disputes. Transcripts of oral 
argument-themselves crowded with references to international treaty 
canons-testify eloquently to the vital role that these canons played in 
domestic courts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Courts 
recognized that international treaty canons constituted a field of law 
distinct from ordinary domestic public and private law that must be 
ascertained by reference to international consensus. 150 
In theory, courts' responsibility to apply customary international 
treaty canons remains a cardinal rule in U.S. jurisprudence today. 
Customary international treaty canons do not merely displace domestic 
common law canons; they become authoritative federal rules of which 
Confederation, the treaty power's international valence "was never out of mind in the days of the 
Constitutional Convention." Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National 
Law of the United States II, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 792, 821-22 (1953); see also Jay, supra note 242, 
at 827 ("In its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised ... the law governing the relations 
between states."). 
148. The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227,246 (1817). 
149. See THOMAS M. F RANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMULATIONS 97 (1987) (quoting Chief 
Justice Jay's opinion). 
150. See, e.g., De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (arguing that because treaties 
"are contracts between independent nations, in their construction, the words are to be taken in 
their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations .... "); United States v. 
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20 ( 1886) (interpreting an extradition treaty against the background 
of international law); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871) ("Like all the laws of 
nations, [the law of the sea] rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of 
force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally 
accepted as a rule of conduct.. .. Of that fact, we think, we may take judicial notice."); Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 556 (1856) ("International law is founded in the opinions generally 
received and acted on by civilized nations, and enforced by moral sanctions."); Shanks v. Dupont, 
28 U.S. 242, 250 (1830) (distinguishing "rules of interpretation applicable to treaties between 
independent states" from public-law and common law principles). 
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courts must take judicial notice. 151 "The frame of reference in 
interpreting treaties is naturally international and not domestic," Justice 
Stevens has explained. "Construction of treaties yielding parochial 
variations in their implementation are anathema to the raison d'etre of 
treaties, and hence to the rules of construction applicable to them." 152 
When U.S. courts preside over treaty cases, they truly become "courts 
of all the nations of the world," participants in an ancient, international 
judicial system. 153 
In sum, U.S. courts have long ascribed to the internationalist 
paradigm, treating international treaty law as U.S. treaty law. 
International treaty canons are U.S. treaty canons. And, like other fields 
of customary international law, "courts must interpret" international 
treaty law "not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among 
the nations of the world today." 154 Centuries of judicial practice confirm 
that international treaty canons are "our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice."155 
B. The International Crisis and the United States' Response 
Given the internationalist paradigm's firm foundation in judicial 
rhetoric, how is it that U.S. courts have retreated from the Vienna 
Convention's internationalist treaty canons? Before the 1920s, the 
notion that domestic courts should follow a unique nationalist approach 
rather than apply customary international treaty canons (a proposition 
151. SeeKer v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (suggesting that courts must take notice of 
international law). 
152. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262-63 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153. See generally Jenny S. Martinez, The International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2003) (outlining the governing dynamics of an international judicial system 
composed of national, regional, and international tribunals). 
154. Fihirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Filartiga] (citing 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796) (distinguishing the "ancient" law of nations from the 
"modern" law of nations)). Scholars have developed numerous of theories to explain how 
international law becomes U.S. law. See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supra note 110, at 49-51 (describing 
three conventional explanations-transformation, adoption, and harmonization); Harold H. 
Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in Federal Courts of the United 
States, 26 AM. 1. INT'L L. 280 (1932) (describing five originalist theories); Douglas J. Sylvester, 
International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 
32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. I, 10 (1999) ("The founders viewed the law of nations and 
sovereignty as inextricably bound .... This understanding bound the country to honor and adopt 
this law as an incident to sovereignty-without requiring any formal theory of incorporation."). 
155. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Frankowska, supra note 16, at 
307 ("The law of treaties binding in the United States is today what it has been for two 
centuries--customary international law, penetrating the domestic legal order in an almost 
invisible manner."). 
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that some scholars take for granted today) would have seemed patently 
absurd. 156 The contemporary nationalist paradigm apparently took root 
in U.S. treaty law only in the early- to mid-twentieth century, apparently 
reflecting new movements in political and legal theory. While a 
thorough examination of the forces giving rise to this shift is beyond 
this article's scope, it may be helpful to highlight a few general trends. 
By the early decades of the twentieth century, even confirmed 
idealists began to challenge the notion that international treaty law 
represented a coherent, empirically grounded system of customary 
norms. "There is, in fact whatever the names used in the books, no 
system of international law-and still less, of course, a code," Sir Alfred 
Zimmern concluded. "What is to be found in the treatises is simply a 
collection of rules which, when looked at closely, appear to have been 
thrown together, or to have been accumulated, almost at haphazard."157 
In an effort to set the liberal ideal in a more solid foundation, leading 
publicists subjected international treaty law to more rigorous empirical 
analysis but ultimately conceded that relatively few "customary" 
principles evinced the requisite generality and determinacy. 158 By the 
end of the 1920s, this skepticism encountered little resistance; few 
commentators openly espoused the antiquated theory that customary 
international law might provide judicially manageable canons for treaty 
interpretation. J.L. Brierly, for example, argued that there were "no 
technical rules in international law for the interpretation of treaties; [a 
court's] objective can only be to give effect to the intention of the 
parties as fully and fairly as possible."159 Twenty years later, even the 
United Nations itself-the preeminent advocate for the codification of 
international treaty law-openly lamented that few areas of 
international treaty law were entirely "free from doubt and, in some 
cases, from confusion."160 
156. Bederman, supra note 123, at 30 n.76, 261 nn.970-71. 
157. SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918-1935, 
98 (1939). 
158. See. e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 168 (1928) (challenging the existence of 
"technical rules" of treaty interpretation); CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 
(1924) (according international rules of treaty interpretation only "inchoate legal value"); AMOS 
S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 445 (1927) 
(arguing that "[t]he rules for the interpretation of treaties are derived from general jurisprudence" 
but "form no part of International Law proper"); Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 
AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 944 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft] ("[T]he tendency among 
modem writers ... has been to reduce rather than to extend the number of [customary] rules of 
interpretation and to deny them the character of international law altogether."). 
159. BRIERLY,supranote 158,at 168. 
160. Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International 
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/I!Rev.l, at 52 (1948), cited in Richard D. Kearney and 
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As international publicists began to challenge international treaty 
law's generality and determinacy, on the domestic front the burgeoning 
American legal realist movement provided a second potent challenge to 
U.S. courts' application of international treaty law. Theorists such as 
Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and Roscoe Pound denounced the 
popular "theory that rules decide cases," arguing that legal thought 
could not be divorced from moral and political discourse generally and 
from a judge's idiosyncratic values and biases in particular. 161 New 
insights into the logical indeterminacy of established rules, the 
ambiguity of legal language, the problem of social and economic 
change, the multiplicity and imprecision of precedents, and other 
analytic difficulties augmented realists' skepticism toward formal 
canons. 162 In Pound's words, "[T]he certainty attained by mechanical 
application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory."163 
Legal realism challenged customary treaty canons' legitimacy not 
only by undermining their claim to customary status, but also by 
questioning their ability to provide determinate, objective results. As a 
substitute for formalistic rules, American scholars developed 
innovative, process-oriented models for fostering international legal 
order in a post-utopian world. For example, the New Haven School 
pioneered by McDougal and Harold Lasswell counseled courts to 
fashion "a more usable conception of international law" by recognizing 
and accommodating "authority and control" rather than focusing 
myopically on "rules and operations."164 McDougal and Lasswell argued 
that courts should forsake the quixotic quest for mechanistic treaty 
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L 495,496 (1970). Note, however, that 
even those commentators most skeptical "customary" treaty canons' existence nevertheless 
implicitly recognized some rules as having universal application. For instance, the 1928 edition of 
Oppenheim's celebrated treatise on international law argued that neither "customary nor 
conventional rules of international law exist concerning the interpretation of treaties," but 
proceeded to recommend a number of "rules of interpretation which recommend themselves, 
because everybody agrees upon their suitability." L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 759-61 
(Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928). 
161. Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. I, 7 (1934); see 
also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a 
Realistic Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); see generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 193 
(1992) (describing the Realists' challenge to the "claim that legal thought was separate and 
autonomous from moral and political discourse" as "the most important legacy of Realism"). 
162. WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE 
JUDICIA PROCESS 55-67 (1968). 
163. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 71 ( 1954). 
164. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 169 (1960) (reprinting 1959 
article). 
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canons and embrace flexible, process-oriented decision-making 
strategies that allow judges to grapple with their decisions' broader 
policy consequences. 165 If courts, not canons, decide particular cases, the 
legitimacy of judicial decisions naturally turns on the legitimacy of the 
substantive values and policies that animate a court's decision-making 
process. Thus, the New Haven School's tum to normative interpretive 
theories provided a framework for mediating between legal realism's 
"rule-skepticism" and traditional "rule of law" values. 
Like the American legal realists, political realists of the 1930s and 
1940s such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau challenged the notion 
that abstract rules could constrain judicial decision-making. Unlike the 
legal realists, however, political realists dismissed the notion that arid 
legal doctrines or decision-making processes could significantly 
influence international relations. Rather, political realists argued that 
international law inevitably served the interests of powerful nation-
states by mirroring and sustaining the prevailing equilibrium of 
power. 166 
Believing that international stability depended upon political 
calculation rather than legal legitimization, Carr denied that 
international disputes could be resolved through adjudication rather than 
diplomacy backed by force. 167 Morgenthau similarly rejected municipal 
adjudication as a mechanism for resolving treaty disputes: 
In the international field, it is the subjects of the law themselves 
that not only legislate for themselves but are also the supreme 
authority for interpreting and giving concrete meaning to their 
own legislative enactments. They will naturally interpret and 
apply the provisions of international law in the light of their 
particular and divergent conceptions of the national interest. 
They will naturally marshal them to the support of their 
particular international policies and will thus destroy whatever 
restraining power, applicable to all, these rules of international 
law, despite their vagueness and ambiguity, might have 
165. See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL ., INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967) (outlining a policy-oriented interpretive theory that emphasizes 
the role of individual decision-makers in the resolution of global problems.). 
166. Thus, the "bankruptcy of [international] utopianism resides" not merely in its failure to 
constrain state actors, Carr argues, but also "in the exposure of its inabilities to provide any 
absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs." EDWARD HALLETT 
CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939, Ill (1940). 
167. !d. at 178-80; see also MICHAEL JOSEPH SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO 
KISSINGER 82 (1986) (describing Carr's skepticism toward judicial resolution of treaty-related 
disputes). 
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possessed. 168 
By Morgenthau's reasoning, international rules of treaty 
interpretation-like treaties themselves-are of limited practical utility, 
because they do not actually constrain powerful states from applying 
treaties in self-serving ways. Courts might invoke internationalist 
canons when this approach advances national interests, but not when 
political expedience directs otherwise. 169 
Thus, the early decades of the twentieth century witnessed a 
weakening of the United States' internationalist paradigm as new 
theoretical movements challenged customary international canons' 
empirical underpinnings, efficacy, and moral and political legitimacy. 
American jurists responded to this challenge in several ways. 
First, legal academics and diplomats participated in a variety of 
international conferences that endeavored to crystallize and codify 
customary treaty canons in multilateral conventions. These early 
codification efforts aimed to reconcile theory and practice by forging a 
new global consensus around basic customary principles. These 
conferences produced influential draft treaties such as the 1929 Havana 
Convention170 and the 1935 Harvard Draft Convention, 171 but no single 
draft secured the collective approval of the international community. 
Over time, however, this codification movement laid the groundwork 
for the International Law Commission's more successful efforts in the 
decades following the Second World War. 
Second, U.S. courts filled the jurisprudential vacuum in international 
treaty law with "general principles of law."172 This approach tracked 
Hersch Lauterpacht's famous prescription that courts should use general 
168. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE 258 (2d ed. 1954). Morgenthau did not dispute the existence of an international legal 
regime, "primitive" though it might be: "[T]o deny that international law exists at all as a system 
of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence .... To recognize that international law 
exists is, however, not tantamount to asserting that it is .. . effective in regulating and restraining 
the struggle for power on the international scene." /d. at 251. 
169. Lauterpacht adopts this view in a later article, citing traditional canons "more out of 
piety than conviction" while resolutely maintaining that international treaty canons are often 
merely "the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means." Hersch 
Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of 
Treaties, 26 BRIT. YB. INT 'L L. 48, 49, 53 (1949). 
170. Convention on Treaties, adopted by the Sixth International Conference of American 
States at Havana, February 20, 1928, 29 AM . J. INT' L L. 1205 (Supp. 1935). 
171. Harvard Draft, supra note 159. 
172. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 48, art. 38 (recognizing "the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as a legitimate source of international 
law). 
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principles of law to fill gaps between consensual norms. 173 Asserting 
that "the legal nature of private law contracts and international law 
treaties is essentially the same," Lauterpacht urged courts to restore 
international order in treaty interpretation by rebuilding international 
law on a foundation of neutral, transnational contract principles. 174 
Courts should not apply this contract analogy indiscriminately, 
however: 
Nothing is more likely to obscure the identity of contracts and 
treaties, or to bring into disrepute the recourse to analogy based 
on recognition of such identity, than the indiscriminate appeal to 
rules belonging exclusively to one system of private law and 
owing their origin to special reasons of time and place. It is only 
general principles of the private law of contracts, following with 
logical necessity from the very conception of that institute of 
law, which may, and must, be applied.175 
Unfortunately, U.S. courts embraced Lauterpacht's private-law 
analogy during the mid-twentieth century without heeding this 
cautionary counsel. This approach stabilized U.S. treaty jurisprudence 
domestically, but it also set U.S. treaty practice adrift from its 
internationalist moorings. 
Third, U.S. courts responded to the global crisis in international 
treaty law by according heightened deference to the political branches' 
interests and expertise. Prior to the 1930s, the Supreme Court explicitly 
deferred to the executive branch only in the limited subset of extradition 
treaties, and then only in cases involving the Secretary of State's 
decision whether to extradite a criminal (on the theory that this 
determination presented a political question). 176 In 1933, however, the 
Court broadened its theory of deference by proclaiming a general rule 
that courts should defer to executive treaty interpretations whenever 
173. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
215-96 (Archon Books 1970) (1927); see also MARTI KOSKENIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF 
NATIONS 364 (2001) (describing Lauterpacht ' s intellectual leadership in this movement toward 
general principles oflaw). 
174. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 176, at 176; see also STEPHEN HALEY ALLEN, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 70 ("Generally the meaning of a treaty is to be ascertained by the 
same rules of construction and course of reasoning as is applied in the interpretation of private 
contracts."). 
175. !d. at 176-77. 
176. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S . 447, 476 (1913) (deferring to the executive 
branch's decision to extradite an individual); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (I 902) (The 
decisions of the Executive Department in matters of extradition, within its own sphere, and in 
accordance with the Constitution, are not open to judicial revision). 
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questions arise involving treaty interpretation. 177 
C. Treaty Interpretation after the United States 'Response 
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing 
discussion is also the most obvious : The contemporary nationalist 
paradigm in U.S. treaty interpretation is not an originalist paradigm, nor 
is it an inevitable outgrowth of the United States' "dualist" legal system. 
For nearly a century and a half after the founding, U.S. courts employed 
a predominately monist treaty jurisprudence in which U.S. courts 
invoked and applied international treaty canons as U.S. law. 
If the Supreme Court's response to the skepticism and uncertainty of 
the 1920s-1940s in fact represented a genuine "constitutional moment" 
in U.S. treaty jurisprudence, this "moment" apparently went unnoticed 
by the courts that masterminded the revolution. There is little evidence 
that judges of the period intended to abandon the internationalist 
paradigm for a nationalist paradigm or even recognized the growing 
dissonance between U.S. common law canons and general international 
practice. To the maximum extent possible, courts continued to rely upon 
international consensus as a guide. Indeed, even during the heyday of 
legal realism and political realism, courts regularly affirmed their duty 
to decide treaty cases impartially according to internationalist canons. 178 
With international treaty law in shambles, American courts simply had 
no choice but to formulate new common law principles to aid them in 
disposing of the treaty cases that came within their purview. 
III . EVALUATING THE INTERNATIONALIST PARADIGM 
At the end of the day, the internationalist paradigm's survival will 
undoubtedly depend less upon its historical pedigree than upon the 
177. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933). Even in Factor, however, the 
Court maintained that treaties should be construed "so as to effect the apparent intention of the 
parties to secure equality and reciprocity between" treaty parties. /d. at 293 . 
Deference to executive agencies also defused concerns that judicial treaty interpretation 
constituted a nonjusticiable political question. See, e.g., TSUNE-CHI YO, THE INTERPRETATION 
OF TREATIES 70-71 ( 1927) (arguing that if "judges of an arbitral tribunal should be given a 
right.. .[to] apply[] rules of construction without sufficient evidence, they ... would be free even to 
distort the issue of the most unnatural shapes, and cripple where they had sought only to adjust its 
proportions according to their own arbitrary opinions."); cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 
( 1962) (indicating that the lack of judicially manageable standards renders an issue a 
nonjusticiable "political question"). 
178. See, e.g., Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653 (1946); State Tax Commission v. Gas Co., 
284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("As treaties are contracts between independent nations, their words are to 
be taken in their ordinary meaning ' as understood in the public law of nations."'). 
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normative question lurking behind the scenes: Should U.S. courts 
continue to conceptualize treaty interpretation through an 
internationalist lens or should they pursue nationalist, common law 
canons? While international relations scholars might approach this 
question from a variety of perspectives, my focus here is somewhat 
narrower: Is the Vienna Convention's internationalist approach 
compatible with the United States' legal system? Are there compelling 
legal justifications for shifting to the nationalist paradigm? 
Tensions between the nationalist and internationalist paradigms in 
U.S. treaty interpretation feed into broader scholarly debates in legal 
academia over American exceptionalism in foreign affairs. Recently, the 
nationalist paradigm has gained new adherents as revisionist scholars 
such as Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, and John Yoo have re-
examined, and have attempted to recast, domestic courts' traditional 
role in transnational litigation. Flashpoints in the nationalist/ 
internationalist debate include the scope of the President's foreign 
affairs powers, federal courts' competency to apply customary 
international law, and the appropriate relationship between domestic 
and international tribunals. Revisionists share a common set of 
assumptions concerning the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs 
powers, the definitional attributes of state sovereignty, contemporary 
international law's alleged "democratic deficit," and the superiority of 
domestic jurisgenerative institutions vis-a-vis international institutions. 
Thus, the Vienna Convention's contemporary vitality depends in no 
small part on the force and accuracy of these revisionist critiques. 
A. Constitutional Concerns 
Whether U.S. courts should follow the Vienna Convention or 
nationalist common law canons naturally depends upon the approaches' 
compatibility with domestic constitutional and statutory law. No federal 
or state legislature has enacted uniform rules for treaty construction; 179 
the only domestic text that limits courts' interpretive discretion is the 
Constitution itself. Four provisions address the treaty power directly. 
Article I, Section I 0 forbids states from engaging in independent treaty 
making with foreign nations. 180 Article II, Section 2 provides that the 
President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
179. Several American states have codified guidelines for judicial interpretation of state 
legislation. E.g. , MINN. STAT. § 645 (2002); Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, I PA. 
CONS. STAT.§§ 1921-28 (2003). The U.S. Code also codifies a number of interpretive principles. 
See, e.g., I U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (providing instructions for construing various types of words). 
180. U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty .... "). 
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Senate to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur." 181 Article III, Section 2 extends "the judicial Power to . .. all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made" pursuant to the Constitution and 
laws of the United States. 182 Finally, the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, 
Clause 2, declares treaties to be the "Supreme law of the land," which 
binds all St!ites within the union.183 Most objections to the Vienna 
Convention turn on these four constitutional provisions. These 
objections warrant careful scrutiny, since constitutional norms 
supersede customary international law in the United States' "dualist" 
system. Should the Vienna Convention's application violate the 
Constitution, U.S . courts would have no choice but to modify or 
abandon the Convention's internationalist approach. 
1. Advice and Consent 
One possible constitutional objection to the Vienna Convention 
concerns the Senate's authority to render "advice and consent" in the 
ratification of treaties. Over the past two decades, few issues in U.S. 
foreign affairs law have generated as much controversy as the Senate's 
constitutional advice and consent responsibility. President Reagan's 
1983 "Star Wars" speech, 184 in which he announced his intent to 
reinterpret the 1972 Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM 
TreatyY85 and the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
(INF Treaty), 186 provided the initial focal point for this debate. While an 
exhaustive examination of this issue is beyond this Article's scope, 
several points deserve consideration. 
First, there can be little doubt that, in some circumstances, the Treaty 
Clause may require domestic courts to construe treaties in a manner 
inconsistent with the Vienna Convention. Consider, for example, the 
Senate's ongoing practice of attaching reservations, declarations, and 
understandings to treaties. Although understandings do not ordinarily 
alter treaties' substantive content, 187 reservations and declarations often 
181. U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
182. U.S. CONST., art. Ill,§ 2, cl.l. 
183. U.S. CONST., art. VI,§ I, cl. 2. 
184. National Security: President Reagan 's address to the Nation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 442 (Mar. 23, 1983). 
185. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. 
186. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, Dec. 8, 
1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1459 (Dec. 14, 1987). 
187. The State Department has defined an "understanding" as "a statement when it is not 
intended to modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty in its international operation but is 
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materially modify a treaty provision's meaning. In most cases, the 
United States simultaneously concludes "a protocol of exchange" with 
treaty partners-an auxiliary agreement that spells out the prospective 
significance of any Senate reservations, declarations, or understandings 
appended to the first treaty. 188 Occasionally, however, the United States 
dispenses with additional diplomatic negotiations and simply attaches 
reservations, declarations, and understandings without obtaining treaty 
partners' express or implied consent. Under such circumstances, the 
Vienna Convention's instruction that courts should consider only 
materials accepted by both treaty partners would preclude judicial 
consideration of Senate reservations and declarations. 189 Nevertheless, 
because the Senate conditions its constitutionally required consent upon 
these reservations and declarations, American courts bear a unique 
constitutional obligation to honor these unilateral instruments. 190 
Aside from official reservations, declarations, and understandings, 
however, the Senate's constitutional role in domestic treaty 
interpretation remains highly controversial. In the context of the 
ABM/INF controversy, several schools of thought developed to explain 
the Senate's constitutional role in treaty practice. Some scholars 
analogized the Senate's authority in treaty ratification to the executive's 
intended merely to clarify or explain or to deal with some matter incidental to the operation of the 
treaty in a manner other than as a substantive reservation." MICHAEL J. GLENNON & THOMAS 
FRANCK, 2 UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 16 ( 1980). 
188. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 132 (1990). 
189. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31-32. 
190. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly 
recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty"); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone 
Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 351 (1945) (giving legal effect to a Senate treaty 
amendment); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869) 
("In this country ... the Federal Constitution declares [treaties] to be the law of the land. 
If so, before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it, 
must agree to it. But the Senate ... may modify or amend it, as was done with the treaty 
under consideration."). 
John Norton Moore has questioned the conventional wisdom that Senate reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) bind domestic courts, on the ground that the Supremacy 
Clause only makes "[t]reaties made, or which shall be made" the "supreme Law of the land, not 
domestic conditions attached to treaties or ... separate legally binding Senate interpretations apart 
from the treaty." John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution, and the Rule of 
Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 193 (2001). The Restatement provides some support for Moore's 
view. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 303, n.4 ("A condition imposed by the Senate that does not 
seek to modify the treaty and is solely of domestic import, is not part of the treaty and hence does 
not partake of its character as 'supreme law of the land."'). If accepted, Moore's challenge to 
domestic RUDs would support my thesis that U.S. law does not prevent domestic courts from 
applying the Vienna Convention. Nevertheless, because a full exploration of this question is 
beyond this Article's scope, I will simply assume for brevity's sake that RUDs fall within the 
Supremacy Clause. 
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veto power in the federal legislative process, arguing that courts should 
not accord the Senate's subjective understanding of a treaty (as 
evidenced in the ratification record) any deference. 191 Others reasoned 
that the Senate cannot effectively "consent" to what it does not 
understand; any treaty interpretation that conflicts with the Senate's 
subjective original understanding would therefore lack the "consent" 
necessary for Article-II legitimacy.192 A third school contended that 
courts should presume that the Senate consents to a treaty's 
international meaning as defined by international treaty law. 193 
To date, courts have offered only limited assistance in resolving this 
debate. 194 No court has declared the Constitution requires coUrts to 
consider Senate ratification in all cases. While courts occasionally 
consult Senate ratification materials in order to clarify the Senate's 
subjective intent, 195 they typically rationalize this maneuver by stressing 
that Senate ratification materials are "useful" for clarifying the 
executive's intent as the United States' representative in treaty 
negotiations-not that the Constitution itself requires deference to 
Senate ratification materials. 
Strict adherence to the Senate's subjective understanding of treaty 
provisions makes little sense from a pragmatic perspective. As one 
commentator has cautioned, "[t]o require that the President meet both 
the nation's international obligations and the passively-gained 
understandings of the Senate would sometimes place the Executive in a 
double bind. Nothing in the Constitution or its interpretive history 
requires the President to be placed in that position."196 Even assuming 
191. E.g .. John C. Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of 
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001). 
192. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The President Versus the Senate in Treaty Interpretation: 
What's All the Fuss About?, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (1990). 
193. E.g.. David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of 
Arms Control Treaties , 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1408-12 (1989). 
194. Most of these cases address the President's authority to form international agreements 
other than Article II treaties. See, e.g. , Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982) ("[T]he 
President may enter into certain binding agreements with foreign nations without complying with 
the formalities required by the Treaty Clause of the Constitution .... "); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
195. See Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 
(1989) (identifying seven cases in which the Supreme Court has considered Senate ratification 
materials). 
196. Kenneth S. Gallant, American Treaties, International Law: Treaty Interpretation after 
the Biden Condition, 21 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 1067, 1103 (1989); see also Malvina Halberstam, A 
Treaty is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 63 (noting that this approach would mean that 
"the President would have to review the whole pre-ratification record ... every time a question of 
treaty interpretation arose, to see whether he could decipher any Senate understanding-explicit 
or implicit-that would require him to take a particular position on the question."). 
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arguendo that the Constitution requires deference to the Senate's 
express reservations, declarations, and understandings, this 
constitutional requirement would not excuse courts from following the 
Vienna Convention when these conflicts are absent. Express Senate 
reservations, declarations, and understandings would be rendered 
superfluous if courts could bypass treaties' ordinary meaning by 
privileging less formal expressions of Senate intent. In short, although 
express reservations, declarations, and understandings may require 
judicial deference, the Treaty Clause does not obligate courts to defer to 
the Senate's informal interpretations of treaties rather than apply the 
Vienna Convention's customary international canons. 
2. The Judicial Power and Article II 
Several scholars have defended the nationalist paradigm on the 
ground that the Constitution commits treaty interpretation primarily to 
the executive branch rather than the judicial branch. Arguments for 
executive supremacy have considerable intuitive appeal, since the 
United States could not function effectively on the international plane 
without executive institutions competent to negotiate and execute 
international agreements. In theory, maximizing executive discretion 
over domestic treaty practice augments the executive's capacity to 
perform the United States' informal and secret international 
commitments. Nevertheless, these arguments for heightened judicial 
deference to executive treaty interpretations ultimately remain 
unpersuasive, because they do not adequately account for the judiciary's 
nonderogable constitutional role. 
Advocates for judicial deference in treaty interpretation typically 
contend that the Constitution vests foreign affairs power primarily in the 
executive branch. John Y oo, for example, has argued that the Treaty 
Clause's location within Article II rather than Article III reflects the 
Framers' understanding of the treaty power as a fundamentally 
executive power. All matters respecting the functioning of 
treaties-their formation, execution, enforcement, and 
interpretation-fall within Article II's general endowment of authority 
to the executive branch. This constitutional allocation of interpretive 
power also finds expression in the Vesting Clause, which declares that 
all unenumerated executive powers-including, Y oo suggests, the treaty 
power-reside within the executive branch. 197 
197. John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1305, 1309 (2002) (citing U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 1, cl. 1). 
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Y oo argues further that "treaty interpretation has to rest with the 
President due to his management of foreign policy and his constitutional 
control over the interpretation of international law on behalf of the 
United States .... The President must constantly interpret international 
law in the course of conducting our day-to-day foreign affairs."198 In 
Yoo's opinion, the President's constitutional competency to execute 
treaties entails the corresponding competency to interpret treaties on the 
United States' behalf. Given the elusive ontology of party intent, the 
power to bind the United States to particular treaty interpretations must 
rest with the branch that has the greatest political accountability and the 
most intimate acquaintance with treatymakers' original agreement. 199 
Although executive branch's constitutional authority to "take Care 
that the Laws are faithfully executed"200 undoubtedly extends to treaties 
with foreign nations, as Y oo suggests, this authority to interpret treaties 
for execution purposes does not justify executive supremacy in treaty 
interpretation. Federal legislation provides the obvious analogue in U.S. 
law: No one seriously challenges the executive's competence to 
interpret federal statutes since this interpretive authority falls within the 
President's authority to administer the public implementation of federal 
law. Yet this executive competence does not utterly preempt the 
judiciary's final authority "to say what the law is."201 On the contrary, 
courts consistently have defended the constitutional grundnorm that 
Article-III judges, rather than elected officers or appointed bureaucrats, 
have the final say when questions arise involving the interpretation of 
self-executing treaties.202 
As with federal legislation, all three branches of government play 
important constitutional roles in treaty formation and internalization. 
Two-thirds of the Senate must "concur" before treaties negotiated by the 
executive become U.S. law.203 Once the Senate tenders its consent, a 
198. Jd. at 1310. ln this respect, Yoo 's thesis echoes Professor W. Michael Reisman's earlier 
observation in the context of the ABMIIMF debate: "The issue is simply the competence to 
perform treaties internationally. If you cannot interpret, you cannot perform." W. Michael 
Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence To Interpret Treaties, IS YALE J. INT'L 
L. 316,326 (1990). 
199. Yoo, supra note 196, at 881. Yoo does not explain, however, why party intent should be 
considered more elusive in the treaty context than in the context of private contracts. 
200. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 3. 
201. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
202. E.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) 
("[T]he courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements ... and we cannot 
shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones."). 
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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treaty becomes the "supreme Law of the Land."204 The executive's 
constitutional duty to see that treaties are "faithfully executed" does not 
give executive agencies unbounded interpretive discretion over treaties; 
on the contrary, it obligates agencies to conform their actions to judicial 
decisions. 205 "[T]he judicial power extends "to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under [self-executing] Treaties," just as it extends to 
cases arising under the Constitution and "the Laws of the United 
States,"206 and courts possess the same supreme interpretive authority 
with respect to U.S. treaties that they possess in cases involving federal 
constitutional and statutory law. Treaties "partake of the nature of 
municipal law," as the Supreme Court stressed in The Head Money 
Cases/07 meaning that, for interpretation purposes, "[t]he Constitution 
ofthe United States places such provisions as these in the same category 
as other laws of Congress."208 
Acknowledging courts' constitutional role in U.S. treaty 
interpretation, Professor Curtis Bradley offers a somewhat more 
nuanced defense of the nationalist paradigm.209 According to Bradley, 
the Supreme Court's deference to executive treaty interpretations 
closely parallels the Chevron doctrine in administrative law:210 courts 
actually defer to executive agencies' interpretations of ambiguous 
treaties based upon an implicit presumption that "United States 
treatymakers [i.e., the President and Senate] ... delegate[] interpretive 
power to the executive branch because of its special expertise in foreign 
affairs."211 Tracking Chevron, courts do not defer to an executive 
agency's treaty interpretation if the treaty's plain language resolves the 
issue, if the interpretation is patently unreasonable, or if the interpreting 
agency is not itself responsible for administering the treaty.212 
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § I, cl. 2. 
205. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1263, 1271 (2002) ("As part of the law of the land, [self-executing treaties] must also fall 
within the executive's obligation in Article II, Section 3 to 'take care' that the 'Laws' are 
faithfully executed."); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 649, 655 (2000) (arguing that self-executing treaties are "part of the 'Laws' referred to in 
Article II's Take Care Clause"). 
206. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. 
207. 112 u.s. 580,598 (1884). 
208. !d. 
209. Bradley, supra note 213. 
210. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(suggesting that courts should ordinarily defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes). 
211. Bradley, supra note 209, at 702; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 169 n.577, 303 
n.l178 (200 I) (analogizing judicial deference to executive agencies in treaty cases to Chevron). 
212. Bradley, supra note 213, at 703. 
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Viewed from a nationalist perspective, Bradley's Chevron paradigm 
effectively safeguards the Constitution's checks and balances. To the 
extent that treaties are ambiguous, the Chevron paradigm presumes that 
the Senate delegates interpretive discretion to executive agencies (unless 
such delegation seems unreasonable under the circumstances),213 
maximizing national sovereignty to the extent reasonable under the 
relevant treaty. If the executive branch's interpretation exceeds the 
Senate's intended delegation of authority or violates the Senate's actual 
expectations, Congress may effectively overrule the President's treaty 
interpretation by enacting superceding legislation. 
Bradley's Chevron paradigm is far less compelling, however, when 
viewed from an internationalist perspective. Granting policymaking 
discretion to executive agencies may cause a single, self-executing 
treaty to have fundamentally different meanings under international and 
domestic law. Chevron deference thus draws U.S. treaty jurisprudence 
into conflict with international treaty law's foundational principle, pacta 
sunt servanda.214 
Bradley's Chevron analogy also glosses over the basic principle that 
U.S. treatymakers cannot unilaterally delegate interpretive authority to 
executive agencies, because these institutions lack treaty-making 
authority without the express consent of an Indian tribe, foreign 
sovereign, or other international entity. Far from compelling courts to 
defer to executive treaty interpretations, the Constitution arguably 
restricts U.S. treatymakers' authority to render binding treaty 
interpretations by making judicial interpretation the rule and 
congressional override of judicial interpretations the exception. Unless 
treaty parties clearly communicate their intent to delegate interpretive 
power to municipal authorities, U .S. courts should not impede 
international uniformity by according the executive's subjective treaty 
interpretations Chevron deference. 
Of course, courts need not (and should not) disregard executive treaty 
interpretations entirely. Executive treaty interpretations may merit great 
weight based upon a variety of factors, including the cogency of the 
213. !d. at 703-04 ("Issues such as the effect and validity of a Senate reservation and whether 
a treaty overrides earlier federal legislation are issues not likely to be delegated by the Senate to 
the executive branch .... [C]ourts have not tended to give Chevron-like deference to the executive 
branch on those issues."). 
214. As discussed previously, U.S. courts have overwhelmingly defended the internationalist 
paradigm, affirming that courts' primary duty in treaty cases is to honor States' collective intent 
rather than the United States' unilateral interests. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 
(1985) ("[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent 
with the shared expectations of the contracting parties."). 
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agency's reasoning, the agency's relevant expertise, and evidence that 
the United States' treaty partners have ratified the agency's 
interpretation. A particularly important factor in a court's deference 
assessment is the extent to which the agency's proposed interpretation 
will further international legal order by safeguarding public and private 
reliance and by enhancing the law's coherence, predictability, and 
uniformity.215 Applying persuasiveness deference, rather than Chevron 
deference, decreases the likelihood that domestic courts will adopt self-
serving treaty interpretations that violate treaty partners' reasonable 
expectations and the United States' own international obligations. 216 
3. Customary International Law and the Separation of Powers 
A third potential objection to the Viemia Convention's interpretive 
regime might be formulated thus: If U.S. courts may apply the Vienna 
Convention's treaty-interpretation principles as customary international 
law, doesn't this undermine the Treaty Clause by licensing courts to 
internalize treaties that the political branches have rejected? 
Viewed from a nationalist perspective, courts that apply unratified 
multilateral conventions violate the Constitution's delicate separation of 
powers. Since "the nature of the treaty/customary law distinction may 
determine who makes the law, who applies the law, and who is subject 
to it," courts' discretion to identify and apply customary international 
law arguably effects a judicial coup d'etat.211 To escape potential 
separation-of-powers conflicts, nationalists argue that courts should not 
allow unratified treaties to slip in the back door through customary 
international law. Senator Jesse Helms, for example, has analogized the 
Vienna Convention's domestic effect to that of "a dead cat lying on 
somebody's doorstep .... [U]ntil the proposed convention is brought 
before the Senate for consideration in executive session .. .its provisions 
have no relevance whatsoever. .. and ought to be ignored."218 
Although the distinction may be somewhat slippery in practice, the 
power to identify customary international law should not be mistaken 
for an arbitrary power to override the political branches' foreign-policy 
215. In determining whether to defer to executive treaty interpretations, courts regularly 
consult the positions adopted by the United States' treaty partners. See, e.g., El AI Israel Airlines, 
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76 n.16 (1999) (considering decisions of New 
Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom). 
216. For more detailed critiques of Bradley's thesis, see Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron 
Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927 (2003), and Van Alstine, supra note 
205, at 1298-1302. 
217. Chodosh, supra note 58, at 990-91. 
218. 134 CONG.REC. Ll1460 (1988). 
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determinations. As Professor Henkin has observed, "courts do not create 
but rather find international law, generally by examining the practices 
and attitudes of foreign states. Even the practices and attitudes of the 
United States that contribute to international law do not emanate from 
and respond to life in this society, as does the common law."219 Because 
courts identify customary international law by reference to opinio juris 
and state practice, their discretion to internalize provisions from 
multilateral treaties is relatively slight.220 More importantly, separation-
of-powers concerns are particularly weak in the treaty-interpretation 
context, because the Constitution grants federal courts authority to 
develop common law canons even in the absence of authoritative 
international canons. Rather than expand their own power to the 
political branches' prejudice, federal courts arguably cabin their own 
discretion by applying the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework. 
The Supreme Court outlined the principles that govern U.S. courts' 
incorporation of customary international law in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, a case involving the Cuban government's 
expropriation of property owned by a U.S. corporation.221 According to 
Sabbatino, domestic judicial relief is restricted by the common law "act 
of state" doctrine, which declares that "[ e ]very sovereign State is bound 
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the 
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the 
government of another done within its own territory."222 Although "the 
Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine," the Court 
explained, the principle that courts should ordinarily honor the actions 
of other nation-states nevertheless has important '"constitutional' 
underpinnings"223 : 
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of 
government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the 
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement 
particular kinds of decisions in the area of international 
219. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987). 
220. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 
1824, 1853 (1998) ("When construing customary international law, federal courts arguably 
exercise less judicial discretion than when making other kinds of federal common law, as their 
task is not to create rules willy-nilly, but rather to discern rules of decision from an existing 
corpus of customary international law rules."). But see Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate 
Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 396 (2002) (challenging the 
proposition that customary international law is highly determinate). 
221. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
222. /d. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). 
223. !d. at 423. 
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relations.... If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision 
binding on federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither 
international law nor the Constitution, its continuing vitality 
depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of 
functions between the judicial and political branches of the 
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.224 
Significantly, Justice Harlan's majority opinion does not portray the 
act of state doctrine as a constitutional requirement that trumps 
customary international norms in all cases; instead, the doctrine's 
"vitality" turns upon its capacity to safeguard the proper distribution of 
powers between the judiciary and the political branches. This 
constitutional allocation of authority depends, in tum, upon the clarity 
and universality of the customary norm under scrutiny: 
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or 
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the 
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions 
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of 
an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the 
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the 
national interest or with international justice.225 
As Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have observed, Justice Harlan's 
opinion establishes a "sliding scale" for determining the justiciability of 
customary international norms.226 Where international law is clear and 
international consensus (i.e., state practice and opinio juris) sufficiently 
strong, courts must apply international law rather than develop 
independent principles themselves. On the other hand, where an 
224. !d. at 427-28. 
225. !d. at 428. In addition to Sabbatino's generality and determinacy prongs, the Court also 
suggests a third consideration: "It is also evident that some aspects of international law touch 
much more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the implications of an 
issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political 
branches." !d. As I have argued, international consensus regarding the Vienna Convention's 
customary status, combined with the political branches' acceptance of the Vienna Convention as 
an authoritative guide to customary international law, render such concerns relatively 
unproblematic. Assertions that the Vienna Convention's interpretive regime might 
"touch ... sharply on national nerves" in some individual cases are not really arguments against the 
Vienna Convention itself but rather against judicial treaty interpretation as a whole (i.e., that 
courts should defer to the executive in politically sensitive cases). !d. 
226. Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga 's Firm Footing, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 
482 (1997); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Techtonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 
409 (1990) (commenting that "in Sabbatino" the Court "suggested that a sort of balancing 
approach could be applied" to "the validity of the act of a foreign sovereign within its own 
territory"). 
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international norm remains inchoate or international consensus 
uncertain, courts must leave the norm's refinement and enforcement to 
the political branches. Thus, Sabbatino's sliding scale prevents courts 
from unreasonably restricting the political branches' foreign policy 
discretion, but also respects the fundamental principle that states' 
responsibility to comply with customary international law increases as 
international consensus develops as to the law's content.227 
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court argued that the norm against 
expropriation of foreign property had not achieved sufficient 
international consensus to overcome separation-of-powers concerns. 
Nevertheless, the Court clearly anticipated that future courts would 
apply customary international law in other settings where the law's 
clarity and consensus were sufficiently great. Since Sabbatino, federal 
courts have employed Sabbatino's sliding scale in a variety of settings 
as the authoritative metric for determining customary international law's 
justiciability. The leading precedent in this area is the Second Circuit's 
groundbreaking 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,228 which 
established that noncitizens may bring civil actions in U.S. courts under 
the United States' Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) to punish 
international human-rights violations.229 
In Filartiga, a Paraguayan national sued a Paraguayan official for 
committing acts of torture and wrongful death in violation of 
227. See James Anaya, Customary International Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 41, 43 
(1998) (describing this principle in the context of international human rights norms). In Sabbatino 
itself, the Supreme Court found a lack of international consensus with respect to the alleged norm 
against expropriations of foreign property. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("There are few if any 
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a 
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."). Given this alleged absence of international 
consensus, judicial application of an inchoate norm against expropriations of foreign property 
would constitute an impermissible encroachment on the executive's foreign-affairs power: 
When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the 
Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional 
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for 
the community of nations and protective of national concerns. 
!d. at 432-33. Should courts expand or contract customary norms notwithstanding conflicting 
State practice and opinio juris, this would significantly impede the Executive's ability to advocate 
understandings of emerging customary norms that promote U.S. interests. As the Sabbatino Court 
justly cautioned, "the possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive Branches [in such 
cases] could hardly be avoided." !d. at 433. Naturally, the distinction between activist 
"progressive development" and conservative "application" of preexisting standards is ambiguous 
at best. Sabbatino's sliding scale reflects the variegated spectrum between these ideals. 
228. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876. 
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.") 
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international covenants, declarations, and practices, which he alleged 
constituted "the customary international law of human rights and the 
law of nations."23° Finding the plaintiff to have a colorable claim under 
the A TCA, the Second Circuit agreed that the international norm 
prohibiting torture was of sufficient generality to warrant judicial 
application. "[T]here are few, if any, issues in international law today," 
the court concluded, "on which opinion seems to be so united as the 
limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody."231 
As evidence of this global consensus, the court noted that the 
prohibition against official torture had "become part of customary 
international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. "232 Other international accords such as 
the UN Charter33 and the UN Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture234 also witnessed the norm's 
customary status. In light of these findings, the Second Circuit 
concluded that the international norm prohibiting official torture had 
attained sufficient international acceptance to merit judicial application. 
Less heralded than the Second Circuit's generality finding, but 
equally important to the court's ultimate decision, was the second prong 
of Sa b bat in o 's balancing test-the determinacy requirement. 
Considered in the abstract, the international norm against torture might 
seem to be riddled with practical uncertainties. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit 
reached precisely this conclusion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
when it determined that the torture prohibition's applicability to non-
state actors had yet to achieve the broad international consensus 
necessary for domestic judicial enforcement. 235 The determinacy prong 
proved far less problematic in Filartiga, however, for two reasons: First, 
the complaint involved allegations of official torture-an offense falling 
squarely within the customary norm's core traditional meaning. Second, 
230. 630 F.2d at 879. 
231. !d. at 881. 
232. G.A.R. 217 (III)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I, at 71 (1948) (stating that "no one shall 
be subjected to torture"). 
233. U.N. CHARTER art. 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations ... the United Nations 
shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all .... "), art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."). 
234. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N.Doc. A/10034 
(1975). 
235. 726 F.2d 774, 792 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing the Sabbatino test but fmding 
the "degree of 'codification or consensus' ... too slight"); id. at 805 (Bork, J., concurring) 
("Adjudication ... would require the analysis of international legal principles that are anything but 
clearly defined .... "). 
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binding international declarations provided clear support for the torture 
prohibition's applicability to the acts considered in Filartiga. As the 
court's opinion observed, "[t]hese U.N. declarations [prohibiting official 
torture] are significant because they specify with great precision the 
obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, 
' [ m ]embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human 
rights they promised in the Charter to promote. "'236 Because the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights specifically enumerated official 
torture as a human-rights violation, the Second Circuit concluded that 
the norm had attained sufficient determinacy to merit domestic judicial 
application. Indeed, confronted with the norm's codification in these 
and other "international conventions and declarations," even Judge 
Robert H. Bork conceded in Tel-Oren that "the proscription of official 
torture" is "'clear and unambiguous. "'237 
Both Filartiga and Tel-Oren demonstrate that multilateral treaties 
with quasi-universal membership not only provide evidence that state 
practice and opinio juris have attained sufficient generality for judicial 
application, but also clarify customary norms' content "with great[er] 
precision." Thus, after norms have been codified and affirmed by 
international consensus, individual nation-states ordinarily can no 
longer contend that the codified customary norms lack sufficient 
determinacy for principled judicial application.238 By promoting the 
clarity of customary international law, multilateral conventions like the 
Vienna Convention defuse separation-of-powers concerns and thereby 
increase courts' constitutional responsibility to apply customary 
international law. 
Under Sabbatino's sliding scale, the Vienna Convention's customary 
international canons would seem ideally suited for application in U.S. 
courts. Just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided the 
clarity and specificity necessary for the Second Circuit's Filartiga 
decision, numerous state and federal courts have recognized that 
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention possess the normative clarity 
and specificity necessary for application as customary international 
law.239 Admittedly, the Convention's flexible interpretive guidelines 
236. Filcirtiga, 630 F.2d at 883 (quoting Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents 
on Human Rights , in The United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission 
(Commission to Study the Organization of Peace ed. 1968)). 
237. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819-20 (Bork, J., concurring). 
238. See, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 , 965 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (accepting 
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone established by the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea-an instrument the United States has yet to ratify). 
239. See notes and text accompanying supra note 87. 
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permit municipal judges to exercise considerable discretion (as would 
any reasonably effective system). But it would be difficult to argue that 
these guidelines do not lend themselves to principled judicial 
application. On the contrary, the Vienna Convention's detractors 
typically criticize Articles 31-33 for being rather too rigid and specific. 
By any reasonable standard, the Vienna Convention's international 
canons clearly satisfy Sabbatino 's generality and determinacy 
requirements for application in U.S. courts.240 
Of course, separation-of-powers objections such as these often veil 
deeper concerns about the so-called "democratic deficit" in customary 
international law generally. From a nationalist perspective, judicial 
incorporation of unratified multilateral conventions privileges 
international consensus over domestic, democratic processes. Yet 
concerns about the democratic legitimacy of customary international 
law have little traction in the treaty-interpretation context. All available 
evidence indicates that Congress and the executive branch fully accept 
the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework as customary 
international law. The State Department has consistently recognized that 
Articles 31-33 represent an authoritative guide to customary 
international canons of treaty interpretation, and the Foreign Relations 
Committee's ratification record contains no significant challenge to this 
determination. Applying the Vienna Convention's customary 
international canons does not weaken the political branches' control 
over the United States' treaty obligations; it simply allows judges to 
apply a body of law that the political branches already accept. Thus, 
even assuming that customary international law's domestic legitimacy 
turns upon the consent of U.S. foreign policymakers, the Vienna 
Convention's applicability remains unimpeached.241 
240. In addition to the Sabbatino analysis, Congress's capacity to override judicial 
internalization of customary international law also cuts against nationalist concerns regarding 
judicial incorporation of the Vienna Convention. As Justice Bradley explained in The 
Lottawanna, customary international law has force in domestic courts only insofar as Congress 
permits. 88 U.S. (2 I Wall) 558, 577 (1874). With the exception of nonderogable jus co gens 
norms, Congress may override customary international law-including Articles 31-33 of the 
Vienna Convention-if it chooses to exercise this power. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 
(1932) (describing the Congress's power to preempt international maritime law as being "beyond 
dispute"); Dickinson, supra note 14 7, at 810-11. 
241. My own view is that the very nature of customary international law precludes 
disproportionate deference to the executive and legislative branches. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Rose v. Hime/y, "the law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of 
nations, and is supposed to be equally understood by all." 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 277 (1808). 
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B. Customary Treaty Canons as Common Law 
Aside from the foregoing constitutional concerns, the Vienna 
Convention's incomplete internalization into U.S. law might reflect 
popular uncertainty regarding the international treaty canons' 
jurisprudential status. The principle that "international law is part of our 
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice" 
has formed a cornerstone of U.S. jurisprudence since the earliest days of 
the American republic. 242 But courts have yet to define precisely why 
international law is part of our law and how they should ascertain and 
administer its commands. "Treaties and the laws of the United States are 
proclaimed by the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land," 
observes Maria Frankowska. "The Constitution is silent, however, on 
the status of customary international law within the U.S . legal 
system."243 As principles of international custom, the legitimacy of the 
Vienna Convention's interpretive canons depends, in large part, upon 
customary international law's general legitimacy. 
Over the last several years, customary international law's status 
within U.S. law has become a veritable battleground for competing 
visions of the United States' interrelationship with the international 
community. On one side of the battle line, internationalist scholars have 
defended the orthodox view that customary international law enters 
domestic law as a strain of federal common law.244 Marshaled against 
this mainstream position is an emerging vanguard of revisionist scholars 
who contend that the Supreme Court's landmark decision, Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins / 45 utterly abolishes federal courts' law-generative 
authority-including the competence to identify applicable rules of 
customary international law.246 According to revisionists, the authority 
242. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For excellent discussions of the law of 
nations' role in early American life, see JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 6-7 ( 1996), and Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American 
Law, 42 V AND. L. REv. 819 (1989). 
243. Frankowska, supra note 16, at 388. 
244. E.g., id. at 388 & n.524; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 231, at 468-69; Harold Hongju 
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1824 (1998); Jordan J. Paust, 
Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 301 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International 
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth 
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 
393 (1997). 
245. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
246. E.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 52; Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, 
The Current Illegitimacy of Customary International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation]; Ernest A. Young, 
Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 396 (2002) 
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to articulate norms of customary international law passed to state courts 
after Erie. The stakes in this skirmish are high, since state primacy over 
customary international law would jeopardize federal human rights 
litigation under the A TCA. 247 
Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the revisionists' challenge 
to traditional customary international law, this critique clearly has no 
bearing upon customary international treaty canons' legitimacy. The 
Constitution itself commits stewardship over federal treaty canons to the 
federal judiciary. Two elementary principles of federal jurisdiction 
support this understanding. First, even after Erie, federal courts retain 
the authority to develop common law rules where "necessary to protect 
uniquely federal interests."248 The obvious need for national uniformity 
in foreign relations dictates that the authority to prescribe binding 
principles of treaty construction should vest, for domestic supremacy 
purposes, in federal courts alone. "[U]nder the national government, 
treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will 
always be ... executed in the same manner," John Jay explained in 
Federalist No. 3, "whereas, adjudications on the same points and 
questions in thirteen States ... will not always accord or be consistent."249 
Second and more important, federal courts retain supreme authority 
over domestic treaty canons by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which 
proclaims that all "Treaties"-like all federal statutes-are "supreme 
Law of the Land."250 Pursuant to this provision, federal courts wield the 
same supreme authority over treaty interpretation that they wield with 
respect to the interpretation of the federal constitution and federal 
statutes. This principle finds support in Section 25 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, which authorized the Supreme Court to review decisions of 
state courts where the exercise was "repugnant to the Constitution, 
treaties, or laws of the United States"251 In the United States, treaty 
interpretation is a question of federal law over which federal courts, 
rather than state courts, are the final custodians.252 
(challenging the proposition that customary international law is highly determinate). 
247. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 253. 
248. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1 at 336 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting 
Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
249. THE FEDERALIST NO.3, at 22 (John Jay) (I Bourne ed. 1901). 
250. U.S. CONST. art. Vl, cl. 2. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions 
arising under the ... treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
251. 28 u.s.c. § 1257. 
252. One important implication arising from this analysis is the principle that states lack 
authority to develop canons of treaty interpretation inconsistent with those adopted by federal 
courts. 
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C. Customary Treaty Canons and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Lastly, conventional wisdom suggests that many international norms 
address themselves exclusively to the political branches without 
creating judicially enforceable rights. Some of these norms are thought 
to operate on the "horizontal" level between nation-states, but are not 
considered to have legal force in municipal courts. Drawing upon this 
classical "horizontal" paradigm of international law, some 
commentators suggest that the Vienna Convention's interpretive canons 
address themselves exclusively to the political branches, leaving 
municipal courts free to develop alternative regimes. 
Even if many customary international norms create affirmative duties 
only for the political branches, this restriction clearly does not extend to 
international treaty canons. The Constitution vests supreme authority 
over treaty interpretation in the federal judiciary, and the judiciary-not 
the President or Congress-bears the final responsibility for ensuring 
that the United States interprets self-executing treaties in good faith. 
Admittedly, some treaties that do not give rise to causes of action in 
U.S. courts (i.e., non-self-executing treaties) may address themselves 
exclusively to the political branches, leaving the executive and 
legislative branches to monitor the United States' performance without 
judicial interference. However, the determination whether a treaty is 
self-executing or non-self-executing is itself a question for judiciary 
resolution to which international treaty canons naturally apply.253 Courts 
may respect the political branches' interpretive decisions when treaty 
parties commit agreements exclusively to the political branches' 
discretion, but courts cannot disregard customary treaty canons in 
deciding cases properly before them without undermining their own 
legitimacy. 
A related justification for judicial deference to executive and 
legislative treaty interpretations focuses upon the political branches' 
"sovereign" power to denounce or breach treaty obligations on the 
United States' behalf. Professor Henkin describes this sovereign power 
thus: 
[P]resumably the President can exercise [the sovereign] power 
for the United States, acting under one of his explicit powers or 
under authority he derives from the powers of the United States 
inherent in its sovereignty. If so, the fact that an action of the 
253. In practice, courts apply a variety of tests-both objective and subjective-to determine 
whether treaties are self-executing or non-self-executing. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four 
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 697 (1995). 
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President puts the United States in violation of international law, 
however deplorable that be, does not, ipso facto, render that 
action a violation of the Constitution.254 
In the United States' dualist system, courts cannot compel the 
political branches to perform the nation's treaty obligations. Although 
the United States may suffer political or economic reprisals for violating 
its international agreements, such violations do not constitute 
infringement of the Constitution or laws of the United States. On the 
other hand, the executive branch's "sovereign" authority to breach or 
terminate treaties does not give executive agencies a legal right to 
interpret self-executing treaties contrary to the Vienna Convention's 
customary canons. The United States may denounce or terminate its 
treaty obligations, but the customary international principles that govern 
treaty interpretation cannot be denounced or abrogated unilaterally.255 In 
short, treaty interpretation is not a "political question" necessitating 
judicial abstention. 
IV. REVITALIZING THE INTERNATIONALIST PARADIGM 
The nationalist concerns I have described in the preceding discussion 
continue to impede the Vienna Convention's internalization into U.S. 
law. Although international relations theorists might challenge the 
internationalist paradigm on policy grounds, the preceding discussion 
suggests that the paradigm's doctrinal underpinnings remain sound. The 
Vienna Convention key interpretive guidelines are not, in fact, 
inconsistent with U.S. constitutional or customary international law. 
The Constitution imposes few categorical restraints on courts' 
methodology for interpreting international agreements;256 aside from the 
254. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 236 (1996) 
(citation omitted). 
255. As Justice Iredell declared in 1792, "The law of nations .. .is ... enforced ... by the 
municipal law; which ... may ... facilitate or improve the execution of its decisions ... provided the 
great universal law remains unaltered." Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (1792) 
(second emphasis added). For contemporary commentary discussing this principle, see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. III, intro 
n.2 (Tentative Draft No.6, 1985) (acknowledging that the international law of treaties is a part of 
foreign relations law of the United States); O'CONNELL, supra note 105 at 264-65; Frankowska, 
supra note 16, at 306 (footnote omitted) ("There is ample evidence that U.S. courts apply rules of 
international law when interpreting treaties."); id. at 307 (footnote omitted) ("The law of treaties 
binding in the United States is today what it has been for two centuries-customary international 
law .... Since its rules are applied only in conjunction with a treaty, actual reliance on the law of 
treaties by the courts is not always properly acknowledged."). 
256. See Gallant, supra note 196, at 1094 (footnote omitted) ("The [Supreme] Court has not 
treated the rules of substantive interpretation of treaties, as opposed to their validity and effect on 
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duty to honor the Senate's express reservations, declarations, and 
understandings. In the final analysis, the emerging nationalist paradigm 
in U.S. treaty interpretation does not rest on constitutional principle, but 
rather on a naked policy preference favoring American exceptionalism 
in foreign affairs.257 
Nationalist concerns about the Vienna Convention's determinacy 
and democratic legitimacy remain unpersuasive because they ignore the 
principles that govern courts' assimilation and application of 
international norms. As discussed previously, Sabbatino suggests that 
the Vienna Convention's domestic applicability depends upon three 
factors: (1) whether a preponderance of states observe the relevant norm 
out of a sense of legal obligation, (2) whether the norm has achieved 
sufficient determinacy for principled application in domestic courts, and 
(3) whether judicial internalization of the relevant norm will 
"touch ... sharply on national nerves."258 This multi-factor balancing test 
effectively screens out emerging norms that are not yet ripe for 
domestic internalization. Yet this screening function is only half the 
story: When emerging international norms satisfy the three prongs of 
Sabbatino's sliding scale, they become binding principles of domestic 
law, which U.S. courts must enforce. 
By all accounts, the Vienna Convention's treaty interpretation 
provisions easily satisfy Sabbatino 's three-part test. First, as 
demonstrated in Part I, the Convention's authoritative status has gone 
virtually unchallenged over the last quarter century. International, 
foreign, and domestic courts routinely apply Articles 31-33 as 
customary law when they interpret international agreements. Second, 
the Vienna Convention's textual codification gives its interpretive 
guidelines a sufficiently high degree of determinacy for principled 
application by domestic courts. Third, the Convention's framework for 
federal and state law, as a constitutional matter."). 
257. In reality, courts' failure to internalize the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework 
may reflect ignorance of the Convention's requirements. "For United States jurists," Bederrnan 
has argued, "rules of treaty construction are truly judge-made law, and they remain largely 
ignorant of international glosses on the subject. .. There appears to have been little appreciation of 
substantive canons of treaty interpretation-default rules which favor particular interpretive 
results or policy outcomes." BED ERMAN, supra note 78, at 244. See also Blackmun, supra note 
113, at 8 ("Modem jurists ... are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early Justices 
such as John Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law of nations and felt 
comfortable navigating by it. Today's jurists ... are relatively unfamiliar with interpreting 
instruments of international law."). Even jurisdictions that claim to apply the Vienna 
Convention's interpretive provisions frequently overlook or ignore the distinctions between the 
Convention and the nationalist approach. 
258. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964). 
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treaty interpretation not only does not "touch ... sharply on national 
nerves" but actually furthers American values and interests. The Vienna 
Convention does not present a scenario in which courts seek to 
internalize customary norms in defiance of the executive branch's 
express or tacit disapproval, or even in the proverbial "twilight zone" of 
executive silence.259 Hence even when viewed from a nationalist 
perspective, the judiciary's authority and responsibility to apply the 
Vienna Convention would seem to be "at its maximum."260 The 
Convention clearly has become "part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly 
presented for their detennination."261 
How should the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework inform 
judicial practice in the United States today? The answer is simple 
enough: U.S. courts should explicitly invoke the Vienna Convention 
and construe individual treaty provisions according to the Convention's 
interpretive framework. For purposes of illustration, let us return to the 
point at which we began-the United States' controversial kidnapping 
of Humberto Alvarez-Machain. 
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court's dispute over the U.S.-
Mexico Extradition Treaty's proper interpretation was largely a product 
of the justices' inability to agree upon the relevant interpretive 
principles.262 Although both the majority and dissent apparently 
259. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (describing the executive's authority to act in foreign affairs in the face of 
congressional silence). 
260. !d. at 635 (describing the executive's authority to act in foreign affairs "pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress"). See also Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 
253, 267 (Dec. 20) ("It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, 
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations."); Hiram 
E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 
TEX. INT'L L. J. 87, 122-24 (1991) (explaining that such unilateral declarations may aid in 
crystallizing substantive international law and in clarifying states' international obligations). Even 
judges who advocate a nationalist approach to treaty interpretation that focuses solely on the 
United States' unilateral intent should nevertheless apply the Vienna Convention, since the 
executive branch claims these interpretive principles as its own. 
261. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900). 
262. Given the Court's failure to reach a strong consensus regarding the interpretive 
principles applicable to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, it is not surprising that six justices 
were hesitant to condemn the executive branch's actions: 
That the Executive may wish to reinterpret the Treaty to allow for an action that the 
Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this Court's interpretation .... [B]ut it is 
precisely at such moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty 'to 
render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given 
understanding to ascertain and apply it.' 
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accepted that the Extradition Treaty should be interpreted "in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms" and 
consistent with the treaty's overarching "object and purpose," neither 
seriously considered the Convention's instruction to construe treaties 
"in good faith."263 Informing this assessment of "good faith" is Article 
31(3)(c)'s additional instruction, which enjoins courts to "take into 
account ... [a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable to the 
relations between the parties."264 Thus, a "good faith" treaty 
interpretation would account for "the general principle of international 
law," discussed in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, i.e., "that one 
government may not 'exercise its police power in the territory of 
another state. "'265 The Vienna Convention incorporates this "general 
principle" into the Extradition Treaty by implication. 266 
Of course, the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework does not 
operate mechanically, eliminating the need for courts to exercise "good 
faith" and sound judgment. Instead, the Vienna Convention's function is 
primarily heuristic, channeling courts' reasoning toward a 
circumscribed range of internationally acceptable treaty constructions. 
This observation suggests two obvious limitations to the Convention 
as an interpretive framework: First, as applied to many treaty 
provisions, the Vienna Convention's internationalist canons may not 
provide definitive criteria for selecting between competing 
constructions of a treaty provision. Second, the Vienna Convention's 
interpretive framework may not prevent courts from adopting specious, 
self-serving interpretations in politically sensitive cases. These 
limitations are not unique to the Vienna Convention; they are, as legal 
realists have shown, endemic to the adjudicatory process generally. 
Given these inherent limitations, what contribution can the Vienna 
Convention make to U.S. treaty interpretation? In my view, the Vienna 
Convention's superiority over nationalist common law canons does not 
lie in its (in)ability to transcend the limits of legal reasoning; rather, the 
Convention's value is four-fold: First, the Convention lends greater 
coherence to U.S. treaty jurisprudence by narrowing the gap between 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 686-87 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
263. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(1). 
264. !d. art. 31(3)(c). 
265. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 668 (quoting Brief for Respondent 16). 
266. Even without the Vienna Convention, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion admits the 
possibility that an international norm applicable to treaty interpretation such as the doctrine of 
specialty might deserve judicial deference. /d. at 659-60, 668-69. The Vienna Convention merely 
expands the incorporation of implied terms to embrace relevant norms of customary international 
law applicable between the treaty parties. 
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courts' aspirational internationalist rhetoric and its de facto nationalist 
methodology. Second, the Convention's canons mitigate states' 
disproportionate influence in domestic treaty adjudication. Third, the 
Convention's application enhances U.S. courts' international legitimacy. 
Fourth, the Convention offers a framework for more effective dialogue 
between domestic, foreign, and international tribunals in developing 
transnational treaty regimes. 
Coherence. As this article has demonstrated, tensions between the 
United States' nationalist and internationalist approaches have 
prevented courts from developing a coherent, consistent treaty 
jurisprudence. On a doctrinal level, the Vienna Convention's uneasy 
coexistence with nationalist common law canons sows confusion for 
courts and litigants alike. By adopting the Vienna Convention as a 
foundational text, courts may reverse this trend and bring their actual 
methodology in closer alignment with their internationalist rhetoric. If 
the United States' internationalist paradigm for treaty interpretation is to 
be taken seriously, Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention cannot be 
lightly dismissed. 
Mitigating Statism. It is certainly no secret that international law has 
shifted away from a state-centric paradigm to a more eclectic and 
inclusive paradigm in which "persons," "peoples," and other 
nongovernmental entities have become legitimate subjects of 
international rights and duties. 267 NGOs, for example, play an 
increasingly influential role in the drafting and negotiation of 
international agreements. More important for present purposes, 
numerous international agreements such as the Refugee Convention 
have as their primary purpose the advancement of individual rights 
rather than the promotion of strategic state interests. 
The nationalist approach does not adequately reflect this paradigm 
shift. As Haitian Centers Council demonstrates, the nationalist 
approach's categorical deference to the executive branch and liberal 
construction favoring state sovereignty may prejudice the interests of a 
treaty's intended beneficiaries. Nationalist interpretations may also 
work to the detriment of nongovernmental entities (e.g., corporations, 
charitable organizations) that structure their relationships in reliance on 
a treaty's international meaning. While the Vienna Convention may not 
solve this problem entirely, its focus on objective indicia of party intent 
and a treaty's "object and purpose" are clearly steps in the right 
direction. 
267. Ruth G. Teitel, Humanity 's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 355, 362-63 (2002). 
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Legitimation. The Vienna Convention reminds courts that some 
interpretive strategies, which may find wide acceptance in domestic 
constitutional, statutory, or contract interpretation, are simply 
inapplicable and unacceptable in the treaty context. The Convention 
directs courts toward internationally accepted interpretive principles and 
also away from nationalist strategies that would undermine their 
decisions' legitimacy in the eyes of foreign treaty partners. This 
approach reduces interstate frictions, increases public confidence in the 
judiciary, and encourages prospective litigants to select U.S. courts as a 
forum for resolving their treaty-related disputes. 
The United States may be able to weather the political repercussions 
that flow from nationalist interpretations of bilateral treaties. Aside from 
high-profile cases such as Alvarez-Machain, municipal courts usually 
may adopt nationalist interpretations of bilateral treaties without 
significantly undercutting the United States' diplomatic influence or 
disturbing international regulatory networks. However, when courts 
apply nationalist treaty canons to multilateral treaties, the stakes are far 
higher, since the United States must then take on the whole international 
community. Nationalist treaty interpretations are particularly 
indefensible in this context, because they contravene multilateral 
treaties' core purpose-the promotion of transnational legal 
uniformity.268 
The United States has a compelling interest in cultivating a reputation 
for honoring treaty partners ' reasonable interests and expectations. 
When courts interpret treaties according to internationally accepted 
criteria, they manifest their respect for foreign treaty partners' legitimate 
expectations and interests. The internationalist approach naturally 
increases the United States' soft power in international treaty 
negotiations and enhances U.S. courts' credibility and influence with 
foreign and international courts in the development of multilateral treaty 
regimes. These potential benefits are imperiled when courts ignore 
international treaty canons and interpret treaties according to nationalist 
canons that enhance executive discretion at the expense of traditional 
rule-of-law values. 
Interjudicial Dialogue. The Convention's principles and structure 
provide a universal legal grammar that may facilitate more effective 
communication, cooperation, and decisional uniformity among domestic 
courts and foreign and international tribunals.269 Just as federal courts 
268. See El AI Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 169 (describing "uniformity of rules" as the 
"cardinal purpose" of multilateral conventions such as the Warsaw Convention). 
269. Although "the opinions of [the United States'] sister signatories" are not formally 
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enter the domain of "state law" when they apply state constitutional 
provisions, U.S. courts enter international jurisprudential space when 
they apply treaties. The Vienna Convention situates U.S. courts within a 
global interpretive community, providing a gateway to this 
community's expectations, values, and interests. Rather than excluding 
cultural assumptions from the interpretive process, the Convention 
draws upon and informs the global "cultural assumptions within which 
both texts and contexts take shape for [municipal courts] situated" 
within an international context and thereby mediates between treaty 
parties' often radically dissimilar cultural assumptions.270 
As globalization increases the frequency and intensity of international 
judicial exchange, the global "community of courts" has emerged as a 
vibrant epistemic community capable of unprecedented cooperation in 
international treaty law's progressive development. 271 Articles 31-33 of 
the Vienna Convention help to bridge the "gulfs in language, culture, 
and values that separate nations"272 by providing a set of definitive 
"conventions of description, argument, judgment, and persuasion" to 
facilitate interjudicial dialogue. 273 Naturally, these rudimentary 
interpretive guidelines cannot ensure perfect transnational coordination 
in judicial treaty interpretation, but at very least they provide a starting 
point for a more sophisticated, transnational treaty jurisprudence. 
Whether the Vienna Convention achieves its full potential will depend, 
in large measure, upon U.S. courts' active cooperation. 
binding upon U.S. courts, these decisions-like executive treaty interpretations-are "entitled to 
considerable weight." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (citation omitted); see also El 
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (considering interpretations of 
the Warsaw Convention by the British House of Lords, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
the General Division of the Ontario Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Singapore 
Court of Appeal). 
270. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 300 {1989). For a study of 
interpretive communities' function in municipal treaty interpretation, see Ian Johnstone, Treaty 
Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. lNT'L L. 371 (1991). 
Curiously, Johnstone does not consider the Vienna Convention's role in expressing and 
constituting interpretive communities. 
271. For scholarly commentary on the global "community of courts," see William W. Burke-
White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 
MICH. J. lNT'L L. 1 (2002) (describing the potential and limitations of this international 
community of courts in the context of international criminal law), and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003) (exploring the dynamics of this 
international judicial dialogue). 
272. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 66 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
273. FISH, supra note 275, at 116. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the United States enters the twenty-first century, many of the most 
hotly debated questions in domestic law involve the interpretation of 
international agreements. Recent examples include the definition of 
"unlawful combatants" under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War274 and the scope of foreign nationals' 
right to consular assistance under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Consular Relations.275 International agreements impact innumerable 
other fields of domestic law as well, as the United States cooperates 
with foreign nations to promote transnational legal order. To an 
unprecedented degree, these bilateral and multilateral treaty regimes 
have effected a profound internationalization in the source and content 
ofU.S. law. 
Given treaties' increasing importance as sources of domestic rights 
and obligations, the United States' sovereign interests, and the interests 
of individual U.S. citizens governed by these agreements, are ill-served 
by a schizophrenic treaty jurisprudence that vacillates capriciously 
between conflicting nationalist and internationalist paradigms. 
Internationalist treaty canons are needed more desperately today than at 
any other moment in American history to promote transparency, 
stability, and predictability-in short, the ."rule of law"-in 
transnational treaty litigation. The Vienna Convention moves U.S. 
treaty jurisprudence in this direction by providing courts with 
authoritative internationalist canons for treaty construction. These 
canons are fully compatible with the United States' constitutional 
commitments (subject, arguably, to Senate reservations, declarations, 
and understandings) and clearly satisfy the Supreme Court's "sliding 
scale" test for the judicial internalization of customary international law. 
As a guide to international custom, the Vienna Convention's treaty 
274. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 
U.S.T. 33!6, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See, e.g., AI Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding that a detainee at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo had no right to habeas 
corpus in U.S. courts); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a U.S. 
citizen's apprehension in a combat zone in Afghanistan sufficed to justify his detainment as an 
"enemy combatant"); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that 
an American citizen who fought alongside Taliban soldiers in Afghanistan did not qualify for 
lawful-combatant immunity). See generally George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, AI Qaeda, and the 
Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002). 
275. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. Ill (1999) (refusing 
to grant a preliminary injunction to stay the execution of a German citizen who claimed a 
violation of his rights under the Vienna Convention); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 
(1998) (asserting that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations allowed state law to 
prescribe when a noncitizen's rights to consular access expire). 
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canons furnish an invaluable framework for harmonizing U.S. treaty 
jurisprudence with international law. 
For over two centuries, U.S. courts have applied customary 
international treaty canons in domestic treaty cases with the aspiration 
to promote world public order. It would be an incalculable mistake to 
abandon this internationalist paradigm now, just when internationalist 
treaty canons are needed most. 
